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  absTraCT
Budget support entered the aid scene at the turn of the millennium and it is  con-
sidered as the aid modality par excellence to foster ownership and more effective aid through 
institutional reform. In 2008-2009 a number of political events in aid receiving African coun-
tries however pointed at the difficult relation between budget support and (political) govern-
ance. The paper analyzes donor policies and practices surrounding policy/political dialogue and 
budget support and offers a number of policy recommendations on where and how to deal with 
“political” issues. Based on a desk study carried in March-May 2010 at the request of the Belgian 
Directorate-General for Development Cooperation, the paper presents a substantial analysis 
of Mozambique and Zambia where two recent political crises were successfully resolved by five 
donor countries. The authors argue that using budget support to drive both democratic and eco-
nomic change is hazardous. Acknowledging the synergy between policy and political dialogues, 
the paper posits that technocratic and democratic issues should be separated because there 
are obvious trade-offs between them. Democratic governance issues should be dealt with in 
a separate high level forum, and in a pro-active rather than reactive way. In addition, donors 
need to ensure their interventions do not undermine recipient countries efforts to democratize. 
In effect, they should lower their ambitions: 1) with regard to what they can do: change cannot 
be bought, it can only be supported; 2) with regard to what recipient governments can do: even 
when there is commitment, change is most often gradual, not in big leaps. If anything, politics 
and political savvy should be brought in more, because every reform (however technocratic) is 
profoundly political. IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 7 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
  absTraiT
L’aide budgétaire a fait son entrée sur la scène de l’aide internationale au tournant 
du millénaire et est considérée comme la modalité d’aide par excellence pour favoriser l’appro-
priation ainsi qu’une aide plus efficace par le biais d’une réforme institutionnelle. En 2008-2009, 
un certain nombre d’événements politiques survenus dans des pays africains bénéficiaires d’une 
aide ont toutefois montré la relation difficile entre l’aide budgétaire et la gouvernance (politique). 
Ce document analyse les politiques et pratiques des donateurs autour du dialogue politique et 
de l’aide budgétaire et apporte un certain nombre de recommandations politiques sur la façon 
dont il faut traiter ces questions « politiques » et à quel niveau. A partir d’une étude de bureau 
menée de mars à mai 2010 à la demande de la Direction générale de la coopération et du déve-
loppement en Belgique, le document présente une analyse significative du Mozambique et de la 
Zambie, où deux crises politiques récentes ont été résolues avec succès par cinq pays donateurs. 
Les auteurs avancent le danger du recours à l’aide budgétaire pour commander le changement 
démocratique et économique. Reconnaissant la synergie entre politique et dialogues politiques, 
ce document plaide pour la dissociation des questions technocratiques et démocratiques en 
raison des compromis évidents qui les séparent. Les questions de gouvernance démocratique 
devraient être traitées séparément dans le cadre d’un forum de haut niveau, de façon proactive 
plutôt que réactive. En outre, les donateurs doivent s’assurer que leurs interventions n’anéan-
tissent pas les efforts de démocratisation fournis par les pays bénéficiaires. De fait, ils devraient 
modérer leurs ambitions : 1) quant à ce qu’ils peuvent entreprendre : le changement ne s’achète 
pas, il ne peut qu’être appuyé ; 2) quant à ce que les gouvernements bénéficiaires peuvent entre-
prendre : même avec un engagement, le changement se fait de façon progressive, non pas à 
grands pas. Plus que tout autre chose, politique et savoir-faire politique devraient davantage 
être menés à bien, car chaque réforme, bien que technocratique, se veut profondément politique. IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 9 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
1.  inTroduCTion 
Budget support (BS) is considered the aid modality par excellence to foster owner-
ship and more effective aid through institutional reform. In light of the High Level Forum 4 in 
Busan, Korea (2011) and the progress on implementation of aid effectiveness commitments lag-
ging behind, budget support has become a hot topic on the EU-donors’ agendas in 2009/2010.
In 2008-2009 a number of (political) events in recipient countries pointed at the 
difficult relation and division of powers between political dialogue, policy dialogue and the han-
dling (suspension or not) of BS. More specifically, the cases of Rwanda 2008-2009, Senegal 
2008-2009, Zambia in autumn 2009 and most recently Mozambique mid-end November 2009, 
led to some discussion at the level of the EU-EC with regards to the usefulness and practicality 
of a strict separation between Budget Support policy dialogue and the political dialogue. Some 
donors feel that a strict separation is not effective. They consider that in moments of political 
crisis all available channels for political dialogue should be used, suggesting that budget sup-
port gives a leverage that should be exploited, and that the key issue is about having an effective 
and rapid response to serious events and using the best available mechanisms to get corrective 
action as quickly as possible. The question at hand is thus: what can budget support do/undo, 
how should it be used in moments of crisis, and which fora should be used to tackle different gov-
ernance issues. This study looks into donor policies and practices surrounding policy/political 
dialogue and BS. Documenting these recent events is expected to give important insights and 
inputs to Belgian Development Cooperation’s further positioning on the topic of ‘budget support 
and policy/political dialogue’.




– and, where possible, gain insight on the perceived effects of donor practices on 
recipient governments (important to mention is that besides reconstructing factual 
actions and reactions, this study draws a lot on donor perceptions: on the causes 
and consequences of the political crisis, on the quality and structure of the negotia-
tion processes, on the problems, challenges and gains of donor coordination in case 
of a political crisis). 
•	 confront	policies	and	practices	and	mirror	these	against	the	broader	debate	sur-
rounding aid effectiveness principles (particularly relating insights to debate on 
conditionalities, the goals of harmonization and elements of mutual accountability 
like predictability). 
It was not the goal of this study to focus and label practices of donor X and Y. The 
donor documents and practices were instrumental in trying to identify emerging patterns, mak-
ing abstraction of a particular donor as such. In other words, not the donor was the object of 
study, the patterns were. A short study of two country cases (Zambia, Mozambique) where 
donors disagreed on whether or not there was a breach of ‘underlying principles’ or of similar 
budget-support related commitments (e.g., cases of flagrant corruption), and where donors at-
tempted to use political/policy dialogue (alone or in concertation with other donors) in order to 
convince the partner country government to take steps to change the situation. 10 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
We studied policy documents on BS and suspension of BS of 5 donors[1]. The selec-
tion of these donors was done in a case sensitive manner. The final decision was taken by DGOS. 
This paper cannot reveal which donors have been studied as full anonymity was asked by the 
agencies and guaranteed by the researchers. We gathered information on the crises of two cases 
(Mozambique & Zambia). We interviewed 13 people from 5 donor agencies, mainly people from 
head quarters and in some cases people from the field. All interviews were done by telephone/
skype.
This study has obvious limits. The first one was the very narrow time line. The Terms 
of Reference were finalized by March 15th 2010, and the first deadline for the study was May 
17th 2010. That date we presented the preliminary findings during a DGDC organized workshop 
in which the Budget Support Experts of various member states participated. The final paper was 
due on July 15th 2010. The second limit is that this study cannot serve representative purposes. 
It is limited in scope (limited number of people we spoke to, limited number of donors (5), only 
two case studies) and exploratory in nature. The third and most important limit of this study 
was the availability of information. Reconstructing donor reactions in these two cases which 
were so ‘fresh’ meant that we would have to rely mainly on information from the donors them-
selves like political risk assessments of the recipient country, assessments of the crisis itself, 
telops between field and head quarters, mail exchanges, letters, etc…. For obvious reasons, this 
information is usually not to be shared with outsiders. So beyond the publicly available policy 
documents, we had to rely mainly on the information shared during interviews, which were lim-
ited in quantity but also in time.  
Important to mention however, is that most of the people we talked to were excep-
tionally open, critical and frank in discussing the topic at hand. This was a major advantage for 
us as it allowed us to enrich our analysis and understanding. This paper is, upon request of the 
donors themselves, completely anonymized. The anonymity-guarantee also helped interview-
ees to open up and speak off-record, which was exactly what this study needed. This paper only 
mentions specific agencies when the information concerned is already publicly available. 
[1]   Due to time constraints it was impossible to study more donors: the TOR were approved on March 15th 2010, the 
presentation of the preliminary results took place on May 18th 2010. IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 11 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
2.  on governanCe and budgeT supporT:
  donor visions and sCienTifiC insighTs
2.1.  The governance concept: definitions matter 
Donors differ in how they define and catalogue concepts. In most donor documents 
references will be found regarding the importance of governance, but the meaning and structur-
ing of the concept varies in important ways. Interesting is that donors make a sharp distinction 
between political and technocratic governance. And although most donors refer to human rights, 
elections, free press and media, as important features of political governance, there seems to 
be less uniformity when it comes to cataloguing corruption for example, or decentralization. 
For some these issues are part and parcel of political governance, others approach it more as a 
technocratic dimension. From a donor perspective, the labeling of issues is not a trivial matter, 
because it might determine: the forum in which this should be discussed (political dialogue or 
policy dialogue), who has to be involved (technocrats or politicians/diplomats) and which kind of 
measures (political/technocratic) have to/can be undertaken when things go wrong.
For the sake of clarity, it is important that this study does not get lost in a concep-
tual limbo while trying to apply different donor conceptions of governance. We therefore pro-
pose an alternative conceptualization which is altogether a bit different from donor definitions, 
but hopefully a constructive way in dealing with the conceptual contradictions between donors. 
Instead of speaking about political governance, we will use a concept that is a lot narrower: 
‘democratic governance’. There are three good reasons for doing this:
If it is important to catalogue issues under one label or another (like political or 
technocratic governance) it is important that both categories are mutually exclusive, if not label-
ling would be relatively useless to begin with. Technocratic and political governance are how-
ever not mutually exclusive categories. Quite the contrary, they overlap to a very large extent 
if not fully. Politics is defined as all those activities of cooperation, conflict, bargaining over the 
production, allocation and distribution of tangible and intangible resources (Leftwich 1996). 
Politics is about power, about who gets what, when and how. Politics always entails preferences, 
it’s about making choices (Hyden 2005). From that perspective, technocratic governance is pro-
foundly political, because when it comes to designing and implementing macroeconomic policies, 
composing the budget, dealing with sector reforms, public finance management, etc there are 
always choices to be made, between policies, between priorities, between goals and objectives. 
In fact, there are only very few dimensions in life which are not political. Purely technical deci-
sions (like how to lower inflation) tend to have one solution for one problem, hence no politicking 
is needed if the problem is to be solved. But most reforms are not technical. Bearing in mind that 
that every technocratic intervention is profoundly political might also help donors in accepting 
that expertise alone does not lead to change. Now more than ever political savvy is needed in 
every area of intervention, because aid wants to be a leverage for reform and structural changes. 
Democracy and democratic governance relate to one specific political system. De-
mocracy is one way of getting and losing access to decision making power. Its main features are 
free and fair elections, respect for human rights (including freedom of press). Although quite 
often a direct link is made between transparency and democracy (the most democratic countries 
seem to be the most transparent according to Transparency International), there is less convinc-12 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
ing evidence of the causal elements that lead to lower corruption. Is it economic growth which 
leads to a restructuring of society, higher demands for transparency and subsequently democra-
tization? Or is it democratization that boosts a decline in corrupt behaviour? There is no conclu-
sive evidence here, but the experience in sub-Saharan Africa seems to suggest that the transition 
to electoral democracies not necessarily implies a drop in corruption (Menocal 2007). For sure 
corruption is a political act. It is the use of power to circumvent existing rules, regulations and 
procedures, it is a highly personalized and arbitrary way of giving access to resources, etc… But 
at the same time there is no waterproof political system which prevents it from happening. From 
a somewhat more pragmatic perspective, the aid business and how it borders with diplomacy, 
seems to be more comfortable tackling corruption from a somewhat more technocratic way (like 
the funding of the creation of an ombuds office, strengthening the general auditor’s office, etc) 
which have a less intrusive sound to it than say demanding elections to tackle corruption. For all 
these reasons, we catalogue corruption under the technocratic governance dimension. 
By clearly distinguishing democratic and technocratic governance, we are able to 
avoid confusion and to conceptually distinguish two mutually exclusive labels. It is important to 
stress that the distinction is conceptual, for in the real world and in daily practice most of these 
issues are linked to each other. Therefore, tackling one issue (say press freedom, or the strength-
ening of parliament, civil society) may have important consequences for other issues (corruption, 
PFM,  macroeconomic policies, rule of law). 
The table below summarizes our definition of governance and our understanding of 
the contents of technocratic and democratic governance.  
Table 1:  Composition of the governance concept used in this study
Governance
Technocratic governance Democratic governance















2.2.  Donor visions on the role of budget support: a limited consensus
Donors in general seem to agree on what aid should contribute to in the long run. 
In the long run, low income aid dependent countries are expected to also enjoy high socio-eco-
nomic  standards, high levels of human development, consolidated democratic institutions, a 
culture of respect and tolerance. In Fukuyama’s words, the end goal is this mythical, post card 
version of Denmark, where citizens are free from fear and want, where life is good and institu-
tions performant and just. Development cooperation wants to contribute to this. But how does 
one get there? Which path leads to “Denmark”? And how does this translate into ‘what to start 
with next Monday at the office’?IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 13 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
Going through the different documents, and having listened to our interviewees, it 
seems that most agree that governance matters greatly for development. And in terms of aid 
modalities, budget support (BS) has obvious advantages for reform: it is flexible, it respects 
ownership, it is the most coordinated and aligned way of doing aid. But different downsides were 
mentioned during the study:
•	 First,	BS	has	strong	symbolic	and	political	connotations.	As	it	is	on	and	through	
budget, it becomes closely linked to funding the government in power, a regime, 
maybe even a party in power. BS therefore symbolizes trust in the government and 
its policies. 
•	 Secondly,	BS	is	risky	business:	aid	is	fungible	and	BS	extremely	so.	There	are	quite	
some fiduciary risks. 
	•	Thirdly,	BS	is	difficult	to	follow	in	terms	of	results.	Measuring	attribution	is	impos-
sible and it therefore creates its own set of accountability challenges for donors. 
Less consensus can be found on the sequence of reforms in order to get to “Den-
mark”. And this disagreement is one we find in the scientific literature as well. Are sound tech-
nocratic reforms more important, or more conducive to development in the broad sense of the 
word? And will a democratic setting emerge in these better-off societies? Or is it the other way 
around? And how must one use conditionalities, which conditionalities, and when? We will tack-
le these questions in the remaining part of this paper.
The diverging visions on how to get to Denmark is very notable when comparing the 
BS eligibility criteria of donors. Although all five donors in our sample feel that ‘a sound poverty 
reduction strategy or development plan’ should be in place and that a minimal quality of public 
finance management (PFM) should be guaranteed before moving into flexible forms of BS aid, 
the rest of the eligibility criteria vary widely. 14 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
Table 2:  BS Eligibility criteria: similarities and dissimilarities between 5 donors 
Technocratic Governance
Eligibility Criteria
Donor 1 Donor 2 Donor 3 Donor 4 Donor 5
Sound development Plan X X X X X
PFM X X X X X
Macro economic framework X X X
Quality economic governance – corruption X X X
Quality institutions - country capacity X
Need for aid – reliance on aid X
Democratic Governance
Eligibility Criteria
Donor 1 Donor 2 Donor 3 Donor 4 Donor 5
Human rights, democracy X* X* X X
*explicit reference to human rights
The above table shows that the donors in our sample handled a number of eligibility 
criteria from minimally three to up to seven. Some donors only use technocratic criteria, other 
donors add democratic eligibility criteria. Eligibility criteria reveal crucial issues for and of do-
nors. On the one hand it reveals information on donor visions of things that have to be in place 
on the side of the recipient which serve as basic guarantees that aid will be put to good use. On 
the other hand however some criteria serve accountability purposes for donors because they ac-
commodate political concerns voiced by parliaments and public opinion. Eligibility criteria thus 
serve two purposes: one related to the developmental agenda (recipient side), the other one to 
the political accountability agenda (donor constituency side)
Those donors that combine several criteria were asked if there is a hierarchy be-
tween criteria. In other words, is sound PFM for example more important than, say human rights 
if these were eligibility criteria. Interestingly enough, most donors in our sample did not apply 
weights to criteria. The most important argument forwarded on this was that donors wanted 
to maintain a certain degree of flexibility and autonomy in taking decisions regarding BS. By not 
specifying eligibility criteria in full details and with clearly established benchmarks, the donor 
avoids being cornered or pinpointed. The other extreme is that all criteria are equally important 
and should be fully realized at any moment in time. 
The donors in our sample also differed in the way they assess these eligibility crite-
ria: some use very well specified sets of absolute or relative benchmarks (using governance indi-
cators, or CPIA scores, or WB/IMF assessments), others not[2]. The use of benchmarks has the 
advantage of transparency and predictability, making certain decisions more routinized and me-
chanical. Its downside is exactly the mechanistic approach which leaves little room for flexibility 
or more contextualized assessments or interpretations. Using no indicators or benchmarks al-
lows for a lot of flexibility, but at the expense of transparency and predictability. 
[2]   Yet another way of approaching this was brought to our attention during a meeting of BS experts: looking at 
national tendencies can be contextualized eligibility criteria: only if a set of criteria shows positive evolutions, BS is 
granted.IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 15 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
In some cases eligibility criteria are assessed annually, in other cases just once be-
fore starting BS. Some donors thus use their eligibility criteria as assessment criteria, whereas 
other donors clearly distinguish between both. The latter point to the principle that once a deci-
sion on BS is taken, the commitment is long term and is most often translated in multi-annual 
BS commitments (spanning three to four years). Assessing the performance of the government 
is usually tied into the jointly negotiated Performance Assessment Matrix (PAF). The commit-
ment only comes under stress in case an event would occur that destroys the trust relationship 
between the donor and the recipient. Other donors assess the BS eligibility criteria on an annual 
basis, which tends to imply that BS is committed annually. 
In this respect Adam and Gunning (2002) call for a strong differentiation between 
the indicators that are used as a basis of aid allocation and those that are used to monitor the 
interim progress. Triggers can reconcile the tension between flexibility and discipline (Koeberle 
and Walliser 2006:278). The flexibility gained by specifying only triggers should not be used to 
introduce new disbursement conditions. Triggers can only be modified when recipient govern-
ment agrees, but this should never be used as a leverage for other reform (Gunning 2006:297).
For all the donors in our sample, even the ones that have decentralized a lot of deci-
sion making powers to the field, it is headquarters that has the final say regarding the provision 
and the suspension of BS, although inputs from the field are important in informing the decision. 
But whom in headquarters takes these decisions? 
In our small sample of donors there was some variation in the institutional set-up 
of Development Cooperation. Full integration into the Foreign Affairs Ministry often implies that 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs has the final say. Given that Foreign Affairs and Development 
Cooperation may not share the exact same hierarchy of goals (e.g. Foreign Affairs Ministry ad-
vances national interests: diplomatic, geostrategic, security concerns versus development co-
operation which is closer to the development interests) this may lead to conflicting priorities. A 
very different set-up - in which development cooperation has a Ministry status - provides more 
leeway towards the developmental agenda, although in all studied cases coordination between 
Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation is crucial in the case of BS provision and suspen-
sion.
Suspension of BS is closely related to the Underlying Principles (UPs) as established 
in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). When a breach of UPs occurs, donors will react to 
this. The question is: what exactly constitutes a breach of UPs? It seems that there is no objec-
tive standard for this. The donors we studied differ strongly in this matter. The different defini-
tions of ‘breach’ we identified are the following:
•	 A	breach	is	a	fundamental	and	extreme	reversal	of	the	political	system/situation,	
like a coup. 
•	 A	breach	is	a	deterioration	of	the	UPs.
•	 A	breach	is	when	there	is	no	progress	on	UPs.
These breach definitions, often conceptualized in head quarters, show substantial 
differences in ‘identifying’ or ‘labelling’ and event as problematic or a crisis. It is therefore not 
surprising that donors react so differently when confronted with certain events. Harmonizing 16 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
diagnostics (when is what a crisis) and cures (what to do about a given situation) therefore is a 
daunting, if not impossible task. 
From a more analytical perspective, we found that the way in which the political 
UPs figure in the MOU is in and by itself problematic. To start with, the political UPs are very 
vague: the recipient government is expected to uphold good governance and democracy, to re-
spect human rights, etc. but most low income aid dependent countries are not at all upholding 
these principles, and certainly not to the fullest extent. Governance problems are huge in these 
contexts, and not just at the democratic level. In fact, Polity[3] labels these systems as anocra-
cies or hybrid regimes.  As such the political UPs as written down in the MOU are, put bluntly, 
illusions. This is very much shown in the Mozambique and Zambia case (see later). The events 
which triggered the crisis were not exceptional events. Similar problems have been marking 
these countries since decades. This however did not refrain the donor community to enter into a 
BS relationship, yet those same events do carry the potential to suspend BS. 
This gap between what is on paper and what is actually on the ground, seems to 
suggest that these principles might be: 
•	 interpreted	differently	in	what	they	mean	exactly	(donors	and	recipients),	and/or	
•	 assessed	differently	(demanding	benchmarks	versus	not	so	demanding
  benchmarks), or
•	 interpreted	as	formalistic,	standardized	expressions	(by	the	recipient).
The donors we interviewed admitted that there is no real negotiation regarding 
these political UPs in terms of what they mean exactly, or which elements are seen as crucial 
in these multidimensional concepts. When a breach occures donors different sanction mecha-
nisms. The donors we interviewed mentioned that first of all communication with the govern-
ment is crucial. So announcing (preferably in a coordinated manner) that a breach has occurred 
(or may have occurred) and that this might lead to some donor sanctions (ie a expressing the 
threat) is already important. Next, an intensified dialogue (policy/political) is set-up so as to 
clearly voice the concerns and identify the areas in which the government must take action so 
as to restore the confidence. But after that, donors differ widely on how they handle their aid 
envelopes when a breach has occurred: 
•	 suspending	the	whole	aid	envelope	(not	just	BS)	
•	 suspending	BS	(and	divert	the	envelope	to	other	actors	outside	government	or	hand	
over the envelope to multilateral or other bilateral agencies)
•	 reducing	BS	(sometimes	including	the	whole	aid	envelope)
•	 delaying	BS	(and/or	aid	in	general).
Although most of the donors in our sample have a policy which states that - in line 
with the importance of funding predictability - these ‘sanctions’ cannot be applied in-year (sanc-
tions are to be realized T+1, the year after), several interviewees stated that if a breach is deemed 
serious and extreme, the donor agency would not hesitate to completely cut aid immediately. 
[3]   The polity database (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ssafrica2.htm) shows the evolution of anocracies in 
Subsaharan Africa: after the end of the Cold War the number of authoritarian regimes declined strongly, but this was 
not matched by a comparable rise in democracies, but with a rise in anocracies. Anocracies hold regular elections but 
they are not fully fair or free (the opposition faces serious restrictions like access to funding and getting access to media 
exposure), there is no real alternation in power, parliament is a rubber stamping institution, the media is manipulated, 
silenced or exercises auto-censorship, etc…IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 17 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
This is so because the pressure from parliaments and public opinion might become so important 
that the credibility of the agency crucially depends on its immediate reaction to some events. A 
way of escaping the pressure, especially when BS is being criticized is to move to lower aid mo-
dalities, like Sector BS (SBS) because it is situated closer to the output level. As one interviewee 
put it: “GBS gets all the pains, SBS gets all the gains”. In other words, whenever things go wrong 
it is because GBS doesn’t work, whereas results tend to be attributed to SBS.
2.3.  Tensions unravelled: Using budget support for what exactly?   
The most important point of discussion between the donors we interviewed regards 
the intervention theory behind BS. The table below summarizes two views on BS and analyzes, 
from the aid effectiveness perspective, the advantages and disadvantages. 
The first column, which we will refer to as the technocratic road, emphasizes the 
role of budget support in strengthening the public sector in its technocratic development. It 
therefore disconnects BS from the more democratic areas of concern. This implies that BS is 
not to be used as a sanctioning devise, at least not when there is no breach of UPs. Democrat-
ic issues are expected to be dealt with in another forum (political dialogue) with other people 
(diplomats), different timelines and different sticks and carrots. The best example of this is the 
Article 8 dialogue under the Cotonou Agreement. The policy dialogue is thus narrowed down to 
technocratic discussions, mainly inhabited by topical experts. 
This approach has some advantages and disadvantages. To start with the advan-
tages, this strong separation between technocratic and democratic areas of reform creates clar-
ity for the recipient because as long as the government is on track with its technocratic reforms, 
BS will be disbursed as foreseen. Donor funding is thus more predictable and donor behaviour 
more consistent because disbursement is linked to the targets agreed. The biggest disadvan-
tage is that these fora become too technocratic. Experts may well have substantial knowledge 
and expertise in certain domains, and they may well be able to write out a brilliant reform, but 
this does not mean that it will get implemented. Partial, slow or non-implementation is an often 
recurring problem, and mostly because of political reasons. As such experts often tend to look 
at politics as an obstacle, as part of the problem. It is not uncommon to find some aversion 
against politics in these circles. Another way of looking at it however is that a lot of experts miss 
political savvy, are disconnected from what is politically feasible and the importance of context 
(Grindle 2007). Politics is in fact part of the solution, but one has to watch close enough in order 
to identify what is feasible. Closely related to this is the risk that technocratic progress may be 
undone by lack of progress in the democratic area. The production of economic results for ex-
ample, the quality of the services delivered may in the long run not be upheld if citizens start to 
feel disgruntled about the quality of democracy in their country. Another risk is that the forum 
of policy dialogue (and BS for that matter), to push for technocratic advances, is under-used. 
Reforms in the technocratic dimension may very well have important positive effects in the area 
of democratization, but this presupposes that the people involved have sufficient political savvy 
so as to recognize the window of opportunity and deal with it in the most effective way. Finally, 
there are also legitimacy issues. If donors only look at technocratic areas of reform and turn a 
blind eye to democratic shortcomings, the public opinion, in the recipient country, but also in the 
donor country might feel that the donor is supporting a regime that has no legitimacy. 18 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
Table 3:  BS intervention theories 
BS as a leverage for technocratic
governance





One instrument, one goal (technocratic 
areas of reform)
One instrument, two goals (technocratic and 
democratic areas of reform)




perceived as less intrusive





BS is carrot and stick for technocratic pro-
gress/decay
Disadvantages over-technocratization
lack of democratic progress can under-
mine technocratic gains
under-using BS/policy dialogue
legitimacy issues (at home and locally)






BS only as a stick for democratic governance 
issues
bazooka effect
The technocratic road however is, it seems, not the only area of intervention. As 
mentioned above, it is thought that democratic governance does need attention, but separated 
from the area of policy dialogue, with other people and other means, and with a time horizon 
that is a lot longer, given that democracy is something that evolves slowly and needs time to 
consolidate. The advantages, once again, evolve around predictability and consistency. A clear 
separation serves the purpose of clarity. Another advantage is that, in the best case, the politi-
cal dialogue and the policy dialogue feed into and strengthen each other. The downside is, that if 
both fora are inhabited by very different topics, people and dynamics, there is a chance that they 
become separated and isolated from each other. In the worst case, they undermine each other.
The second column in the table refers to the, what we call, technocratic and demo-
cratic road. Here it is believed that the instrument of BS can serve two goals: technocratic re-
forms and democratic improvements. The idea is that BS, with its political and symbolic conno-
tations, cannot be isolated to just technocratic issues. When things go wrong in the democratic 
department (say for example: human rights violations or problematic elections) BS should be 
used as a leverage there as well. Both the policy and the political dialogue should therefore be 
used to tackle the issues at hand. Advantages and disadvantages are linked to this intervention 
theory. 
To start with the advantages, it gives the donors flexibility to react to whichever 
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cipient government also fits the concerns of many citizens in the North who do not separate 
democracy from development. On the side of the disadvantages we have captured the following 
ideas from interviews. The flexibility for the donor has the downside that it is quite unpredict-
able for the recipient side. Related to this is that the use of BS for tackling democratic governance 
issues tends to be mainly re-active, when things go wrong, and then BS becomes a stick. But 
BS is not used pro-actively in these areas, as such it is not used as a carrot, there is no thought 
through strategy. When BS is used for both areas of reform (in the technocratic area it is more 
pro-active, part and parcel of a reform agenda and a strategy – in the governance area it is more 
reactive, ad hoc, a bit unpredictable) BS runs the risk of being overburdened with too many agen-
das, which may conflict. Overloading BS with too many different objectives may undermine all 
the strengths of the modality (mentioned earlier). Finally, if BS is used as a sanction because one 
area of reform is problematic, the withdrawal may very well cause a huge damage in the other 
area of reform. Pulling the BS plug thus has a ‘bazooka-like effect’ even when a ‘sniper-like ef-
fect’ was intended.
2.4.  What do we know about development paths? Scientific evidence in a  
 nutshell
Figure 1 shows, in a very summarized way, the scientific evidence regarding the link 
between democracy and development. 
















Source: adapted from Global Development Report 2006
Although conventional donor thinking tends to assume that democratic govern-
ance is a precondition for economic growth (which is considered a result of good technocratic 
governance), in history there are only a few cases where democracy clearly preceded growth: 
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economic growth and impressive poverty reduction has most often taken place in countries that 
were characterized by a lack of democratic governance. China, Vietnam, and other newly indus-
trialized countries are well known examples which point to the idea that democracy is not a pre-
condition for economic developmental results[4]. 
Most developmental success stories, including those countries which now belong 
to the high income group and enjoy consolidated democratic institutions, first experienced eco-
nomic growth spurs and then moved towards gradual democratic opening of the system (Gold-
smith 2007). The explanation behind this is that economic growth affects the structure of the 
economy and so does the social structure of society. Especially the growth of a middle class (en-
gine of civil society), the rise of education levels (Leftwich 1996; Ottaway 1997; Tiruneh 2006), 
and the decline of the oligarchic elite (as an anti-democratic force) is believed to be crucial in the 
boosting of democratic aspirations within society (Moore and Putzel 1999). 
Added to this, scholars argue that the success stories have not followed the techno-
cratic institutional prescriptions which donors try to push for in LICs. High levels of corruption, 
un-orthodox growth policies, lacking rule of law, limited or no property rights have character-
ized most of these countries, yet this seemed not to have withheld them from growing fast (Wil-
liams, Duncan, and Landell-Mills 2009; De Haan and Everest-Phillips 2007). China, for instance, 
has enjoyed significant higher growth rates that India, yet it does not perform better along the 
supposedly critical dimensions of growth/investment climate factors (i.e. stability of property 
rights, corruption, rule of law), but rather has other governance capacities that seem to mat-
ter (resource allocation, infrastructure, advanced technologies (De Haan and Everest Phillips 
2007:8-9). 
These insights stand in contrast with other studies which claim that low corruption 
has a positive effect on growth (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 1998), while informality, tax 
evasion have a negative effect on growth (Friedman et al 2000; Kurtz and Schrank 2007). The 
protection of property rights is also often put forward as an important growth booster (De Haan 
and Everest-Phillips 2007). 
Electoral competition can have a negative impact on economic reform. Increased 
public spending in the run-up to elections is not uncommon, yet this can fuel inflation and com-
promise economic reform. Sometimes over-expenditure serves to finance the incumbent party’s 
campaign and bribe voters. Large amounts of money are obtained through corrupt means, like 
raiding social security funds or selling privatized enterprises to political clients at a bargain 
price in exchange for support (Brown 2005:191). Young democracies are often fairly weak, be-
cause they are heavily subjected to popular pressures, which makes it difficult to push through 
unpopular yet necessary reforms (Leftwich 1996). A strong core of state institutions with the 
capacity to promote growth but without being captured by particularist interests is essential. 
This is what Evans (1995:2) refers to as ‘embedded autonomy’. Another point is that politically 
fragile states often need sophisticated and complex mechanisms for decision making in order to 
maintain political stability, yet this might hamper the design and implementation of strong and 
coherent policy frameworks for sustainable economic growth (Hyden et al 2004).  
[4]   This is not to say that authoritarian regimes are per definition better performers. Closer to the truth is that they 
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In sum, there is no conclusive evidence which is able to make a causal link between 
governance and growth. It is argued that governance may be crucial to the investment climate, 
but governance will also impact the way in which the made investments can lead to growth (De 
Haan and Everest-Phillips 2007:9).  
All the above contains some cautious lessons: 
1. From a purely developmental perspective, it is legitimate to soft pedal on demo-
cratic governance issues if the recipient government is performing well on techno-
cratic governance and technocratic results (like growth);
2. Since democracy blossoms from within, it is important for donors to monitor and 
support internal drivers of (democratic) change;
3. Institutional prescriptions (like property rights, anti-corruption bodies etc) often 
become projects of institutional monocropping (Evans 2004) which carry no guar-
antee to produce the intended results. 
2.5.  BS as a leverage: tensions, trade-offs and some recommendations 
BS as a modality entered the aid scene with the introduction of the World Banks’ 
PRSPs (1999). The main objective of the modality therefore was to contribute to poverty reduc-
tion, and about a year later (2000) to contribute to the MDGs as well. BS, from the beginning, 
strived to improve government performance in delivering services, poverty reduction and pro-
poor growth. BS thus very much emphasized the technocratic dimension of development[5]. But 
the production of results often implied the need to reform the public sector. This slow process of 
designing and implementing reforms, of institution building and strengthening is per definition 
a slow and painstaking process that often takes more time than patience. This means that as a 
BS donor, one has to be in for the long haul. 
In our mythical Denmark, development and democracy go hand in hand. In the less 
ideal real world, there are important trade-offs between both. It is very important therefore not 
to confuse two very different kinds of commitment: commitment to democracy and commitment 
to development. A recipient government may display the first, but not necessarily the second 
(or vice versa). When having to make a heart breaking choice between both areas of reform, de-
velopment (the technocratic area) is (because of all the arguments listed earlier in this paper) 
prone to become priority number one. This implies that when there is commitment to reform 
and there is progress on technocratic dimensions, it is (from a purely developmental perspective) 
legitimate to soft pedal on democratic issues. This does not mean however that the democratic 
dimension can be stashed away. Quite the contrary, it must be closely monitored in order to 
detect windows of opportunity which might positively influence the gradual evolution towards 
more openness.  
The paradox lies in the fact that a lot of bilateral donors, contrary to multilateral 
donors, cannot allow for this strict separation between technocratic and democratic governance 
dimensions. Most aid agencies are politically led and therefore very sensitive to the pressure 
of public opinion. Parliaments and the public opinion are either very informed or not informed 
enough about development issues and development cooperation, but according to the people 
we interviewed, these actors regularly raise a series of questions and remarks regarding the mo-
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dality of BS because of its strong political connotations (support to a regime, a party in power). 
Discussions around the legitimacy of BS from the donor home constituency perspective are in-
creasingly dominating the debate in a number of donor countries. It is thus, from the standpoint 
of accountability to the home constituency, normal that agencies react when human rights are 
violated, elections suffer under fraud, or the media is being silenced. Not to react might mean 
political suicide for the politician involved, and a loss of credibility for the agency itself. This loss 
of legitimacy may in turn result in lower budgets in the future. From this perspective there seems 
to be a crucial trade-off between what the developmental agenda might need in a given mo-
ment in time (e.g. soft pedal on democratic governance issues) versus the legitimacy demands 
from donor constituencies. These tensions have no solution. Donors will have to continuously 
try to strike a balance between both conflicting pressures. However, in terms of aid effective-
ness, there are some things donors can improve: 
    First, the political underlying principles in the MOUs tend to be rather vague and 
universalistic: commit to good governance, respect human rights, etc… while the governance 
situation in most of these countries is hugely problematic. It is important that the political UPs 
become less vague, clearer and are a topic for discussion when dealing with the MOU. Especially 
those donors who have demanding parliaments and/or expect nothing less than perfect compli-
ance (or even progress) in this area, are prone to bump into frequent problems with recipient gov-
ernments because the gap between reality and expectations is too big. The GBS evaluation is 
interesting in this respect as it states that on the whole, political risks in general budget support 
have been utterly underestimated. Therefore, political context and threats to the continuity and 
sustainability of budget support are likely to be political and therefore need to be appropriately 
considered (IDD and Associates 2006:7). It is advisable that all budget support arrangements 
undergo a thorough political risk assessment before their initiation. The importance of risk as-
sessments goes beyond the accountability concern donors have. Thorough knowledge and un-
derstanding of the context is a minimum requirement, in order to find a better match between 
expectations and reality. 
Second, to use one instrument (BS) to reach two goals is hazardous. When some-
thing turns awry in one dimension, there is only one way to react (reduce/suspend/delay BS), but 
this will have serious negative consequences for the other area which depends on that same 
modality. As such BS as a sanctioning instrument is rather blunt. One can image occasions when 
a bazooka effect is desirable, but it should also be possible to have a ‘sniper’ effect if this is 
deemed more appropriate (like asset freezing and visa bans).  
Thirdly, democratic governance is still too often dealt with in a reactive and ad hoc 
manner rather than in a proactive strategic way. When donors react, the bads tend to have al-
ready happened. 
A way of tackling the above mentioned problems is to effectively install a separate 
high level forum where democratic governance issues can be dealt with[6] (e.g. Article 8 dialogue 
under the Cotonou Agreement). Such an approach however must be part and parcel of a long 
term shared vision and strategy, including carrots and sticks, and, including close coordination 
with the other dialogue levels that exist. The Art 8 dialogue has been fiercely criticized on this 
account: in theory it contains all the above mentioned elements, in practice however it is per-
ceived to be irregular, toothless, ineffective and all too often it cuts through existing (BS) coordi-
[6]   A very pragmatic way of looking at this is to correctly argue that it is ineffective and inappropriate to discuss 
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nation mechanisms. In part the desire of some donors to pull ‘political’ issues to the table of the 
policy dialogue is exactly because of the ineffectiveness of the Art 8 dialogue. The question is if 
this dialogue can improve under the Lisbon Treaty. A crucial role will be held by the definition of 
the hierarchy of goals between Security issues, European interests and developmental interests. 
The same tension applies to some bilateral donors because on several occasions diplomats and 
development agencies seem to defend different agendas (in-country and across countries[7]). 






Added to all the above, the democratic governance area needs a comprehensive 
long term pro-active strategy. Democratic change blossoms from within and cannot be imposed 
externally. It is also very unlikely that the ruling elite will be very enthusiastic about limiting its 
own power or strengthening internal opposition. It is the job of politicians to stay in power, it is 
the job of society to remove them from power. This means that democratic progress will come 
from within and from below. Donors must therefore: 
•	 assure	that	their	interventions	do	not	undermine	existing	efforts	to	democratize.	
“Do no harm” should be the first principle;
•	 be	attentive	in	which	ways	existing	BS	practices	may	enhance	accountability	as	a	
direct effect. For example, the involvement of Parliament has increased in budget 
processes partially due to BS. In that same way the use of result-based indicators 
can help citizens and organizations to hold the government accountable (European 
Commission 2006: 85; Hammond 2006:101) ;  
•	 develop	a	strategy	to	identify,	strengthen	and	support	domestic	accountability	ac-
tors. Mapping, identifying “democratic drivers of change” is a necessary task.
It is imperative that the bottom-up (strengthening domestic actors) and the top-
down (political dialogue) are synergetic and mutually reinforcing. The strengthening of parlia-
ments, the private sector, media and civil society however needs other aid modalities: core-fund-
ing, capacity building basket funds, but also project assistance may be more suited for fostering 
these institution-building processes (Lieberson, Ray and Franz 2004). 
[7]   During our research several interviewees also pointed to the very different reactions donors display towards 
similar events. When a recipient country is important from a geo-strategic point of view, “it can get away with a lot”, 
when a donor however has no clear long term vision on the role of a given recipient, they tend to be more demanding 
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3.  dealing wiTh poliTiCal Crises: MozaMbique and zaMbia
Why did we select the Mozambique and Zambia cases? In close coordination with 
the Belgian Directorate-General for Development Cooperation these cases were selected for 
three reasons: 
1. At the time the TOR were being issued these were the two most recent cases in 
which a ‘political crisis’ had occurred: this made it easier to reconstruct them, and 
was easier to identify and interview the involved people since most of them are still 
in the same professional position. Reconstructing an ‘older’ case often implies that 
people who were in the field during the events are no longer there due to internal 
career mobility (related to the fact that staff tends to stay 3 to 4 years in a country 
and then moves on to another country or head quarters). The obvious disadvantage 
of such a short time frame is that little to nothing can objectively be verified regard-
ing outcomes of the whole process. 
2. In both cases similar donor tensions played regarding the appropriate use of dia-
logue fora. In which forum should donors discuss those problems which donors la-
bel ‘political’: in the policy dialogue? In the political dialogue? And how does the 
political dialogue at the level of all BS donors relate to the political dialogue of the 
EC (Art 8 in the Cotonou Agreement). 
3. In both cases, the occurrence of seemingly one event (Mozambique elections, a cor-
ruption scandal in Zambia) served as a vehicle to address a large number of con-
cerns which were both technocratic and democratic in nature.  In both cases, the 
negotiation processes thus resulted in an agreement over a relatively long list of 
actions/reforms going well beyond the scope of the specific event. 
Beyond these two ‘similarities’, the cases bear little resemblance and are not so 
suited for comparison. These countries are not only fundamentally different from a historical, 
socio-economic and political perspective (see later), the table below also shows how different 
both cases are in terms of the crisis itself. 
Table 4:  Dissimilarities between both cases
Mozambique Zambia
Trigger of crisis Elections  Corruption scandal
Main actor in revealing the crisis Donors Internal whistleblower 
Importance of BS donors Aid is constructed around BS – 
G19 (BS donors) is the main player
Aid is not constructed around BS 
– PRBS group is relatively small 
with only 9 donors
Status of the country  Donor darling and best practice in 
Harmonization & Alignment
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3.1.  The Mozambique case
In order to avoid information overload we very briefly (and selectively) summarize 
the governance situation in Mozambique. We draw on mainly three sources: Polity database, 
Freedom House and the Governance Indicators. In annex the full reports of Polity and Freedom 
House can be found.
3.1.1.  Democratic and technocratic governance situation in a nutshell
In terms of democratic governance, Mozambique held its first democratic elec-
tions in 1994 after a turbulent and conflict ridden post independence period. The Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) (in power since 1975 after independence from Portugal) 
secured a majority of seats in the National Assembly and these first elections turned RENAMO 
into a peaceful opposition political movement. The figure below, taken from the Polity Data Set  
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm ) shows the authority trends between 
1975 and 2008. On a scale from -10 (authoritarian regime) to 10 (consolidated democracy) Mo-
zambique has been sitting on a score 6 the last 14 years, meaning that no substantial progress 
has been made in the democratic governance area (Polity 2008). Freedom House considers Mo-
zambique to be partly free (Freedom House 2010a).
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FRELIMO has won every election: in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009, but the tensions 
surrounding the elections have been mounting ever since. RENAMO indicated that there has 
been evidence regarding “massive fraud” and international observers have also raised concerns 
regarding the conduct of the National Electoral Commission (CNE) (Freedom House 2010a). 
Mozambique held presidential, legislative, and—for the first time—provincial 
elections in October 2009. The candidate for FRELIMO, Guebuza, was reelected with 75 percent 
of the vote. Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO received 16.4 percent. Daviz Simango of the newly 
formed Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), 8.6 percent. FRELIMO captured 191 of 
250 seats in parliament, RENAMO 51 and the MDM won eight. FRELIMO also won absolute 
majorities in all 10 of the country’s provincial assemblies (Freedom House 2010a). Although the 
European Union and other international observer groups reported that voting was conducted 
in a peaceful and orderly manner, they were highly critical of many preelection and election-day 
processes (see later). 
With regards to technocratic governance, since the end of the civil war, Mozam-
bique has achieved high levels of sustained economic growth due to the political stability in the 
country and the government’s commitment to donor-backed market reforms. Even in the face 
of the recent global crisis, the International Monetary Fund calculated an average real gross 
domestic product growth for Mozambique at 4.5 percent for 2009 (Freedom House 2010a). 
Mozambique is a donor darling. Donors have supported high spending levels on priority social 
sectors and poverty-reduction programs. The government is working to increase the share of 
domestic revenue in government spending by expanding the tax base and increasing foreign in-
vestment. Donors have also put pressure on the government to enact “second generation” liber-
alizing structural reforms to maintain the country’s economic growth. Corruption in government 
and business is pervasive. Mozambique was ranked 130 out of 180 countries (Transparency 
International 2009). Local journalists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the 
Center for Public Integrity have played a crucial monitoring role by investigating and exposing 
high-profile corruption cases (Freedom House 2010a). 
In general, when looking at the governance indicators developed by the World Bank 
Institute, Mozambique does better than the average low income country. It particularly ranks 
relatively high on its political governance indicators: political stability and voice and account-
ability. The more technocratic dimensions are ranked consistently lower, although the country 
still performs better than the average low income country. Although these technocratic dimen-
sions seem weaker than the democratic ones, it is noteworthy that the country performs rela-
tively well in terms of economic growth (see above).28 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
Table 5:  Governance Indicators Mozambique: rank compared to Low Income Group









(0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5)
Voice and Accountability 16 2008 47.6 27.8 -0.02 0.11
Political Stability 10 2008 55.5 26.2 +0.29 0.21
Government Effectiveness 13 2008 42.7 21.2 -0.38 0.17
Regulatory Quality 12 2008 35.3 23.7 -0.47 0.15
Rule of Law 19 2008 28.2 22.7 -0.66 0.13
Control of Corruption 16 2008 34.3 23.5 -0.55 0.14
3.1.2.  Returning to the events at hand: re-constructing the ‘political’ crisis in 2009 
Mozambique experienced a donor crisis which was triggered by the fourth presi-
dential, legislative and first provincial assembly elections in October 2009. The European Union 
Election Observation Mission and African Peer Review Mechanism reports indicated electoral 
flaws which questioned the process of the elections. Added to this, the controversial set up of 
the elections and, to a very great extent, removal of a third political party from voting lists, per-
suaded the donors to act. 
Under the Finnish presidency of G19, an official letter to the Government of Mo-
zambique (December 2009) was sent expressing deep donor concerns over election reform, eco-
nomic governance and anti-corruption. The letter, signed by most members of the group, voiced 
a concern over a possible breach of the underlying principles of the Memorandum of Under-
standing (MoU). In short order, this communication eventually served as the start of an intensi-
fied series of political dialogues with the government of Mozambique. 
The political dialogue was launched in mid December 2009. Donors concurred to 
the need to address governance issues which had progressively been deteriorating in the past 
few years as well as shared their willingness and commitment to restore confidence between 
them and the government of Mozambique so as to continue a smooth partnership in the area 
of budget support. In effect, further disbursements of budget support were made contingent on 
the successful conclusion of political dialogue.  
In March 2010, upon the presentation of action plan by Mozambique, donors re-
ported they would disburse budget support. Political dialogue was successfully closed and Mo-
zambique’s actions and adherence to the action plan were said to be monitored and assessed 
subsequently. It was decided by donors that any further deliberations as to the underlying prin-
ciples would take place within the scope of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement.   
As to the results of the political dialogue (see table 6), an action plan was drawn 
up, reinforced with specific timelines for addressing concerns in 10 areas raised by the donors. 
This plan is set up to guide future donor disbursement decisions. The areas addressed in this 
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which calls for better representativeness of political parties), economic governance, combating 
pervasive corruption, solving issues related to land reform, and placing the national action plan 
of Mozambique under the scrutiny of the African Peer Review Mechanism. Up until now, the in-
clusion of a third political party in the parliament, as requested by donors was realized. Also, the 
new electoral law that builds on the recommendations and findings of the EU Election Observa-
tion Mission and Constitutional Council is being prepared. 
Table 6.  Action plan topics
Mozambique Action Plan Topics
Political Conditionalities                           
  
Participatory governance and electoral reform 
Political inclusivity
Technocratic Conditionalities Economic governance
Combating corruption 
Land Reform 
National action plan of the APRM
Donor actions  BS disbursement delayed (4 donors)
3.1.3.  Donor perceptions on the events leading up to, during and after the crisis 
In terms of the events leading up to the crisis, the elections seem to be the main 
cause of the conflict between donors and the government of Mozambique. The interviews re-
vealed that in reality the elections were the straw that broke the camel’s back. Apparently do-
nors had been accumulating frustrations and disappointments for a very long time. Some do-
nors referred to the ongoing pervasive corruption as the most important area of frustration, the 
alleged links between the dominant FRELIMO party (the Liberation Front of Mozambique) and 
the private as well as public sector. Others mentioned the slow pace of reforms in the justice sec-
tor. At the same time however Mozambique was realizing/complying with the targets as defined 
in the Performance Assessment Framework. Since the PAF is the main point of reference for the 
policy dialogue, the worries of the donors that went beyond specific areas/targets in the PAF 
could not be addressed in this forum. The things that went wrong in the October 2009 elections 
became the final donor frustrations trigger and it was used to address all the concerns that had 
been simmering beneath the surface in the past years.
The donors we interviewed all pointed out that the government of Mozambique was 
very surprised, if not shocked, about the donor reaction (the concerns raised in the letter and the 
subsequent high level forum in December 2009).  Apparently, they had not seen this coming at 
all, more so because their performance at the level of the PAF was more than satisfactory.  
Amongst donors there was some friction related to the question of which forum 
should be used to tackle political issues and at what level: should the policy dialogue be open to 
tackle democratic issues? Or can these issues only be discussed in the political dialogue. Should 
these issues be linked to BS suspension or not? The frictions around this issue ran high. Some 
donors even went as far as considering to leave the G19 budget support group because BS was 
being linked to regime issues which went beyond the PAF. This is not to say that donors did not 
agree on the concerns raised. Quite the contrary. There was a consensus that certain issues re-
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ing the disagreements, donors managed to agree more or less on a common position (with the 
exception of some donors who distanced themselves from the ‘possible breach diagnosis’): that 
there was a need to address governance issues which had progressively been deteriorating in 
the past few years, and that there was a shared willingness and commitment to restore confi-
dence with the government of Mozambique so as to continue a smooth partnership in the area 
of budget support. In effect, further disbursements of budget support were made contingent on 
the successful conclusion of political dialogue. It was however decided that each donor would 
individually decide which results would be sufficient. 
Regarding the existing fora of political dialogue in Mozambique, some interview-
ees refer to the political dialogue of the G19 as the appropriate forum to discuss these issues, 
while criticizing the Art 8 dialogue because it cuts through and undermines existing coordination 
mechanisms, and because it is toothless. Other interviewees felt that both fora were reinforcing 
each other and that there was a good coordination between both. 
The harmonization efforts in the Mozambique case in this crisis were evaluated 
by some interviewees as a best practice. It was mentioned in some interviews that, given the 
specificity of each donor, more harmonization is impossible. Other donors felt that the level of 
harmonization in Mozambique creates a peer pressure that is, in some circumstances unhealthy: 
it restraints a smaller or weaker donor from taking another position. Taking a different stand 
then all of a sudden is seen as if one is deviating from the collectively established norm. In that 
same vein, there were some donors that reacted very quickly to the electoral events. According 
to some interviewees, some member states jumped to conclusions too fast (even before the of-
ficial announcement of the findings by the European Union Election Observation Mission). This 
has an immediate effect on the process. For example, it constrained a range of actions available 
for other donors, such as channeling funds via different modalities. 
On a positive note and equally important to mention, donors did not negotiate bi-
laterally which made negotiations more nuanced and coordinated. In the case of Mozambique 
donors acted ad hoc as this has been a largely an emerging practice and no strategy on how to 
handle such a situation existed prior to the crisis. 
Some donors view little domestic leverage for reforms as a major weakness for 
donors’ actions. Interviewees mentioned that the donor community fell short in reaching out 
to civil society organizations that were voicing discontent around similar issues. As such do-
nors were bypassing and replacing the internal opposition. As a result donors were perceived by 
many, including the media, as interfering with internal politics and conditioning the process in 
Mozambique. This failure to join forces with domestic actors made the negotiation process too 
much donor-driven. 
In the end no sanctions were implemented in Mozambique. Instead, a consensus 
was reached among donors stipulating that further disbursements depend on successful con-
clusion of the political dialogue. Importantly, even though Mozambique is very aid dependent, 
eventually donors did suspend their disbursements. Added to this, even a paper prepared by 
economists titled “Budget Support Responses. EWG Technical Working Paper on the Implica-
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Quite some interviewees see the case of Mozambique as successful because agree-
ments have been concluded which otherwise would not have been made (see table 6). Other 
interviewees claim that too little time has passed and that having an action plan is no guarantee 
for implementation or success. The latter also refer to the plan as too ambitious. 
Perceptions with regard to how this process has affected the relationship between 
donors and the government also differ between donors. Some claim that the process has clari-
fied a lot between both parties and that the relationship has not been negatively affected. Oth-
ers pointed out that the relationship with the government has suffered greatly, that the confi-
dence is gone and the government no longer sees the donors as predictable. One interviewee 
mentioned that  in the framework of a recent study assessing donor performance (PAPPT) the 
government revealed that they perceive donors to be unpredictable, cynical,  biblical and funda-
mentalist. 
The ensuing events, however, have made donors change their budget support strat-
egies. As of next year some of them consider using performance tranches for budget support 
disbursements. Currently 6 out of the 19 donors want to apply a flexible tranche so as to stimu-
late the government to continue implementing their commitments. Likewise, they are working 
on the better ways on how to monitor the action plan. Added to this, most donors interviewed 
were of the opinion that one cannot impose governance reforms externally. By and large, good 
governance is a long-term endogenous process requiring ample grass roots backing. 
3.2.  The Zambia case 
In order to avoid information overload we have limited ourselves to very briefly 
summarize the governance situation in Zambia. We have drawn on mainly three sources: Polity 
database, Freedom House and the Governance Indicators. In annex the full reports of Polity and 
Freedom House can be found.
3.2.1.  Democratic and technocratic governance situation in a nutshell 
The first free elections took place in 1992. Frederick Chiluba and his Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) captured both the presidency and the National Assembly by 
wide margins, thereby defeating former president Kenneth Kaunda and his United National In-
dependence Party (UNIP). In the 1996 elections, the MMD-led government manipulated can-
didacy laws, voter registration, and media coverage in favor of the incumbents. Most opposi-
tion parties boycotted the polls, and the MMD renewed its parliamentary dominance (Freedom 
House 2010).32 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
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MMD won the 2001 and 2006 elections with Levy Mwanawasa. Whereas the 2001 
elections were criticized by domestic and international election monitors (vote rigging and other 
serious irregularities), the 2006 elections were deemed the freest and fairest in 15 years. Mwa-
nawasa died in August 2008. Banda (former vice president, MMD) was elected president with 
40 percent of the vote, against the Patriotic Front (Sata) 38 percent. Sata claimed that the elec-
tions were fraudulent, but his legal challenge calling for a recount was rejected by the Supreme 
Court in March 2009.
During Banda’s time in office, the overall political situation in the country has been 
characterized by contentious politics and governance challenges. The opposition has been able 
to operate, although under some duress. Violent clashes have taken place between supporters 
of the PF and the MMD in both 2008 and 2009, but there is no evidence of systematic harass-
ment of the PF by the government. 
Due to the global economic recession, economic growth slowed in 2008 and 2009 
(despite substantial progress from 2004–2007), although it is believed that increases in the 
global price of copper in 2009 may generate improvements in 2010. Zambia experienced con-
siderable debt relief in 2005 and 2007, and has obtained substantial investment in recent years 
from China. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2008 pledged $79 million to support 
poverty alleviation and economic growth, and in 2009, it agreed to provide over $250 million to 
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Corruption is endemic in Zambia. Although President Rupiah Banda’s launched an 
official anti-corruption policy in July 2009, concerns have emerged regarding his administra-
tion’s commitment to this policy. A series of corruption scandals have occurred in the country. 
One of Banda’s ministers who was forced to resign in April 2009 after being found guilty by a 
judicial tribunal of inappropriate behavior, was re-appointed to a cabinet position, because a 
high court ruling overturned the verdict. Banda has also abetted the political rehabilitation of 
former president Frederick Chiluba. A 2007 British high court judgment against Chiluba on cor-
ruption charges has not yet been registered or enforced in Zambia. Another corruption trial in 
a Zambian high court in August 2009 found the former president not guilty of embezzlement 
charges. When the head of a special task force on corruption attempted to appeal this ruling, 
he was dismissed from his position. Separately, an auditor general report issued in early 2009 
stated that huge sums of money had been lost in 2007 through misuse, theft, and misappro-
priation of public resources. Also in 2009, the Swedish and Dutch governments both suspended 
funding to the health sector after it was revealed that millions of dollars had been embezzled 
from the ministry of health (Freedom House 2010b). Zambia was ranked 99 out of 180 countries 
surveyed (Transparency International 2009). 
Judicial independence is guaranteed by law. However, several decisions in 2009, 
including Chiluba’s acquittal, tainted the public image of the judiciary and raised concerns that 
the executive branch was exercising undue influence over the institution. Legislation was also 
passed in 2009 that allows the executive to increase the number of judges serving on the High 
and Supreme Courts. The lack of qualified personnel, in part because of poor working conditions, 
contributes to significant trial delays (Freedom House 2010b). 
When comparing democratic and technocratic governance dimensions, Zambia in-
terestingly displays the same pattern as Mozambique: it ranks highest on political stability and 
voice and accountability, while its technocratic dimensions are still ranked higher than the aver-
age low income country, but not as good as the democratic governance dimension. 
From the data we would draw the careful conclusion that, much like Mozambique, 
the country scores better on the functioning of the democratic system than on the technocratic 
dimensions. Further comparison with Mozambique brings some interesting questions to mind. 
First of all, in terms of voice and accountability, Zambia is ranked lower than Mozambique, 
whereas in terms of control of corruption it ranks higher than Mozambique. 34 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
Table 7.  Governance Indicators Zambia: rank compared to Low Income Group 









(0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5)
Voice and Accountability 15 2008 45.7 27.8 -0.09 0.12
Political Stability 10 2008 54.5 26.2 +0.29 0.21
Government Effectiveness 13 2008 29.4 21.2 -0.66 0.17
Regulatory Quality 11 2008 41.1 23.7 -0.33 0.16
Rule of Law 17 2008 38.8 22.7 -0.50 0.14
Control of Corruption 15 2008 36.7 23.5 -0.48 0.15
3.2.2.  Returning to the events at hand: re-constructing the ‘political’ crisis in 2009
In May 2009, a newspaper article revealed that the Zambian ministry of health em-
bezzled about $2 million dollars. What is exceptional in this case study is that corruption in the 
ministry of health was discovered by a local domestic whistleblower, the Anti-Corruption Com-
mission (ACC). In its own right, the ACC commissioned a series of investigations in the public 
sector. Shortly after the Netherlands and Sweden announced to delay their disbursements until 
the results of forensic audit were made available, on May 26 the Zambian President on his own 
initiative invited ambassadors from Cooperating Partners (CPs)[8], as well as non budget sup-
port donors, including China, to discuss the situation and the way forward. During the meeting a 
governance matrix was formulated. 
In early June 2009 the government of Zambia received a letter from CPs in which 
they pointed out that two underlying principles, namely public financial management (PFM) 
and good governance were problematic. The deficiencies at the sector levels (health and the 
road sector) were linked to the dysfunctional quality of the overall control systems, among other, 
PFM. The letter indicated that further strengthening was needed so as to prevent the misuse of 
funds and reduce the adverse implications on the government’s poverty reduction agenda.  
Given multiple questions and concerns were raised by the donors, an Art 8 dialogue 
was started up to tackle the concerns regarding the UPs with the government of Zambia. From 
mid June until November 2009 CPs took over the leadership by setting up a broad timetable with 
specific milestones for carrying out the dialogue. Aiming at a structured process and stronger 
assurances and guarantees to all parties, the intensified dialogue resulted in a roadmap agreed 
between CPs and the government of Zambia (see table 8). 
The donors we interviewed stressed that the government of Zambia when present-
ing the budget for 2010, was highly surprised that donors did not commit budget support for 
2010 because of too few guarantees in the presented roadmap. Instead, the donors provided an 
overview of indicative aid tied to progress in the roadmap. However, in November 2009, when 
enough progress was made, the funds were committed and the dialogue was officially concluded. 
[8]   Cooperating Partners (CPs) providing poverty reduction budget support, also called the PRBS Group, consists of 
the African Development Bank, the European Commission, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the 
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The donors generally regarded the dialogue as positive while the actions taken by the govern-
ment of Zambia were said to have generated satisfactory progress. As regards specific achieve-
ments, a new strengthened Performance Assessment Framework was put in place (2009-2011).
Table 8.  Roadmap topics 
Zambia Roadmap Topics
Political Conditionalities                            Freedom of Information Act 
Technocratic Conditionalities PFM 
Sector issues
Anti-corruption 
Donor actions  BS suspended in year (2 donors)
BS rechanneled to other modalities (2 donors)
3.2.3.  Donor perceptions on the events leading up to, during and after the crisis
Interesting to mention is that at the beginning of the crisis, some donors were not 
involved in the initial stages of debate because they were not financially linked to the health sec-
tor. When donors however started to make the analysis that the corruption scandal was symp-
tomatic to the overall problematic quality of the oversight and control systems, this attracted 
the attention of more donors. This analysis resulted in donors picking up more issues concerning 
corruption and other breaches of UPs. In turn, they joined the donor movement that pointed 
to overall problems in the system and the need to strengthen institutions. Therefore, although 
the eruption of the corruption scandal seemed to indicate that the crisis started with one single 
event, the link was quickly made with some frustrations that were simmering beneath the sur-
face in the budget support group. More particularly, since 2008 there had been slow progress 
on the issues of corruption, PFM reform, decentralization, and in the sectors of agriculture, roads 
and health. Much like the Mozambique case thus, it was not a single event that led to a crisis, 
but, a gradual process as donors were becoming increasingly unhappy about the slow progress 
in certain reform areas. The health corruption scandal therefore served as a vehicle to address 
wider governance problems. 
An intensified process of policy and political dialogue between the Zambian gov-
ernment and the PRBS group started in early June 2009. Monthly meetings took place, chaired 
by the PRBS group (the nine donors) in which ambassadors were always present. In 2009 joint 
statements of the nine donors were elaborated in the PRBS group and finally held by the chair of 
the group. The second review was merged with the High Level Policy Dialogue consisting of all 
the Cooperating Partners with the government of Zambia. In addition, the statements were dis-
cussed in the main cooperating partners group and heads of mission/heads of commission level. 
Worth noting, policy dialogue was maintained closely between the Secretary to the Treasury 
and other high ranking officials on the side of the government and CPs on a monthly basis. By 
November 2009, the negotiations resulted in an agreed roadmap (see table 8). 
The policy dialogue consisted of a series of highly harmonized technical meetings. 
Some interviewees criticized the policy dialogue for addressing issues that were too political 
and should not be addressed there, other interviewees found the meetings too technical and 
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is increasingly difficult to decide which dialogue – policy or political – should be used for which 
issues. At the same time, again much in line with the Mozambique case, was the relationship be-
tween the political dialogue by the BS donors and how this relates to the Art 8 dialogue which is 
essentially a European forum. The exclusion of non-EU budget support donors in Art 8 dialogues 
is seen by some as very disturbing. 
The limited number of BS donors did not mean that harmonization between them 
was easy. The donors we interviewed repeatedly mentioned that it was a challenge to keep the 
budget support group together because the interests and positions differed greatly between 
donors, especially with regard to the topics which had to be included in the roadmap and the 
importance of these different topics. Each donor had its specific concern which it wanted to see 
figure in the roadmap, and it took quite some negotiating to reach a consensus on this. Some of 
them underlined the tendency to lose focus on key issues or even mix them up during the nego-
tiations. Alternatively, they need to uncouple reforms by prioritizing and tackling them at ap-
propriate levels. The harmonization effort in Zambia was perceived by different donors as very 
difficult, in part probably because it was the first time that they had to confront such a crisis. It 
has however pushed some donors in considering if they would still engage in such a harmoniza-
tion effort the next time round. Pulling out of the CPs group in the light of tense division lines 
and difficulty to harmonize actions has become an option for some it appears. Added to this, 
one donor we interviewed mentioned that the communication strategy practiced by donors was 
problematic. During the negotiations all donors kept silent vis-à-vis the press. Yet the local press 
pictured the donors as hard and tough because of their talks to suspend aid. This had eventually 
created an atmosphere where the public opinion started to speak out against donors and their 
conditionalities. Hence the question remains how to ensure transparency to the public and at 
the same time maintain effective negotiations with the government.  The question is also how 
to forge links with those civil society organizations that share some the concerns donors have 
regarding the governance situation in the country when civil society is so fragmented. Added to 
that it is difficult to openly support dissent when at the same time donors have to negotiate with 
the government in order to restore confidence. 
The donors’ perception on the Zambian government’s approach to the PRBS group’s 
concerns has varied significantly too. On the one hand, some thought the government treated 
the concerns as minor incidents, looking for short-term fixes. Arguably, they did not fully realize 
the magnitude of effects the outcome of the dialogue would have on donor commitments. On 
the other hand, some praised the government’s strong determination to improve and correct its 
mistakes. On the part of the Zambian government, it could be stated the ministry of finance and 
planning played a very active and constructive role during the dialogue. This suggests that the 
general notion that the public sector tends to take a stand against donors is not entirely true. 
Most of the donors we interviewed feel that the way in which was dealt with the 
Zambian problem was a success. First, in spite of tensions and frictions among donors, consen-
sus was reached. Second, donor reaction to the corruption scandal and concerns over the whole 
monitoring and control systems of the government of Zambia served as a wake-up call to the 
government leaders. Some donors we spoke to indicated that playing a hard game and voicing 
credible sanctions are important instruments to force the government to listen and act on some 
areas of concern. By and large, the interviewees highlighted the format of the dialogue was fa-
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could take appropriate measures. In general, the dialogue consisted of a good and solid learning 
process. Equally important, the donors agree that the roadmap (see table 8) has now become an 
important tool to permanently monitor the steps taken in diverse sectors as its content includes 
robust accounting and audit systems which prevent corrupt practices. Some other interviewees 
doubt whether the existing roadmap will be implemented and will have a long term positive ef-
fect on the reform agenda. 
Looking at the specific results of the dialogue, the government has undertaken 
some actions but it remains to be seen how sustainable these changes will be. For now, meet-
ings and monitoring take place more regularly so as to ensure critical issues are discussed with 
the partner government. What is more, the revision of MoU is now in order, PFM has been put 
back on track, progress has been made on sector issues (particularly in health), an anti-corrup-
tion policy has been launched, the Freedom of Information Act is being prepared.
As far as lessons learned are concerned, some donors have mentioned that har-
monization amongst BS donors increases the credibility of the threat. In the words of one in-
terviewee “a combined effort of several donors increases the leverage of donors substantially 
and is key to success.” According to some donors we interviewed, the partner government has 
now embraced a more determined approach to preventing corrupt practices that is now being 
demonstrated by the actions taken by government agencies. Yet, some donors are less comfort-
able with China’s policy in Zambia, which might undermine closer dialogue with the government. 
Last but not least, some donors concur that the relationship with the government has certainly 
not improved throughout the corruption scandal, and as a result, the government of Zambia 
sees donors not so predictable and reliable as before.
3.3.  Concluding remarks on the cases
Interesting is the fact that, when looking at the governance indicators and some 
of the narratives on political history, both Zambia and Mozambique have scored relatively well 
in terms of political stability, voice and accountability. Especially when compared to other low 
income countries. The shortcomings of the electoral processes, in both countries, date back to 
the beginning of democratic history, and will, most probably not disappear from one election to 
the next (although Zambia has made substantial progress in this area). Tampering with electoral 
procedures is a standard practice in most anocracies (hybrid regimes), and one of many ways to 
ensure that the dominant party stays in power. From this perspective these kinds of problems 
are cyclical and predictable. If donors are genuinely concerned about democratic governance, 
like in the Mozambique case, it should best be addressed in a pro-active way, long before elec-
tions take place, in order to gradually improve electoral procedures and practices. The reactive 
way in which donors have tackled the issue clearly indicates that it’s not about the elections. It 
was about a whole range of concerns. Concerns were multiple, they accumulated, frustrations 
reached a boiling point, but no forum was in place to legitimately address the growing donor dis-
content. The Zambian case responds to a similar logic: one event is used to host a series of con-
cerns which donors apparently could not address in existing fora and under existing formats (like 
the PAF). Fundamentally different from Mozambique is that the event which triggered the pro-
cess in Zambia was – in our definition – a technocratic governance issue. Interestingly enough 
however, it was also used to address at least one topic which was in the democratic governance 
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One of the biggest advantages of results-oriented aid, is at the same time its big-
gest disadvantage. By pinning everything down in indicators, the legitimate scope of discussion 
is narrowed down to that framework (in this case the PAF). Problems or concerns that pop up in 
other areas, or concerns that go beyond one specific reform, may become ‘untouchable’. As such 
the fundamental discussion which gave rise to this study, namely, what to tackle where when a 
crisis occurs (the division of roles between the policy and political dialogue) is a bit misplaced. 
The first relevant question that should be posed is how to organize fora in such a way that grow-
ing discontent/frustration can be channeled and voiced. 
The issue has been raised why some countries, which often perform worse in all 
areas, do get away with electoral shortcomings and other governance challenges. It has been 
mentioned in our interviews that some countries do not have a lot of strategic value, which is the 
main reason why donors dare to play a very tough game and demand a lot from the government. 
Donors that do have strategic concerns soft pedal on a lot of fundamental shortcomings in the 
governance area.
3.4.  What do we know about the effectiveness of conditionalities?
  A literature review
When reviewing the literature, a number of generally acknowledged issues emerge. 
First of all, conditionalities, in general, are considered ineffective. Secondly, this ineffectiveness 
is related to shortcomings at the level of the main actors involved, namely donors and recipients, 
because they face diverging and often conflicting incentive structures. And thirdly, conditionali-
ties also fail because they are not appropriately designed. We will discuss these three points, in a 
very summarized way, below. Important however is that the New Aid Approach, as endorsed by 
the Paris Declaration also hints at how donors can avoid the pitfalls of the past. We discuss this 
throughout the text and we will summarize some recommendations at the end of this section.
From the nineties onwards traditional policy based lending conditionalities have 
been fiercely criticized. The emerging consensus was that these conditionalities were ineffective. 
The donor driven nature of conditionalities (Schmitz 2006; Killick 1997), especially the ex-ante 
policy lending conditionalities which during the era of the structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs), bullied the state into promising reforms over which the recipient government had no 
ownership, hence it resulted in non-compliance (Collier et al. 1997; Stokke 1995). As such it 
failed to bolster reforms, or enhance the impact of development aid on growth or human devel-
opment (Mold 2009:43; White and Morrissey, 1997; Gunning 2005:4; Barder and Birdsall 2006). 
The same line of thinking is applicable to political conditionalities: they are also 
deemed ineffective (e.g. Crawford 2001:198; Barder and Birdsall 2006; Bratton and Van de Walle 
1997; Brown 2005:182). In the best case, they enable a political liberalization, but are less ef-
fective in enabling a full democratic transition, and are least effective in establishing democratic 
consolidation (Brown 2005:185). This is illustrated by a study where 8 out of 25 (32%) politically 
conditioned aid cases resulted in a democratic transition in Africa. Brown labels this as a ‘mod-
erate success rate’, suggesting a spurious relationship (2005:182). Yet, “political conditionality 
often encourages a transition to democracy which is merely electoral, sometimes fomenting ri-
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Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi), and otherwise impeding democratization” (ibid.). Stokke (1995) 
argues that political conditionalities  are bound to be more effective when:
•	 responding	to	a	gross	violation	of	rules	(making	it	easier	to	gather	international	




action therefore helpt to ‘tip the balance’. 
Crawford (1997) tested Stokke’s conditions. He found that in 9 out of 29 cases 
the conditionalities were effective, for reasons mostly in accordance with Stokke’s conditions. 
Crawford not only emphasized the ineffectiveness of political conditionalities, he also pointed 
to the inconsistency in applying political conditionalities: there seems to be no relation between 
sanctions and the degree of human rights violations.  This points to our remark earlier where 
strategic interests of donors may heavily influence the way in which they will react when faced 
with certain events.  
Added to this, what seems to be a success in the short term, might turn out to be 
a problem in the long run. In that same vein, it is important to look beyond the direct effect 
of the conditionality and broaden the view to assess whether other structural developments 
(positive and negative) resulted as part of political conditionality. The focus on intended effects 
of conditionalities often overlooks the unintended consequences in other governance dimen-
sions. The democratic space gained in one area of public life, may well be curtailed in another 
area. The PRSP participation conditionality serves as an interesting example: in some countries 
where PRPS participation exercises took place and where donors were quite satisfied with how 
this had worked, the legal frameworks regarding NGOs and/or other associations were revised 
and severely restricted (Molenaers and Renard 2009). Yet another perspective is that political 
conditionalities can be counterproductive when they are imposed on a reform-oriented govern-
ment committed to development (Schmitz 2006:12).
When it comes to policy conditionalities, it is important to emphasize that domestic 
political variables and context explain compliance with reforms by a recipient government and 
not variables under control by the donors (Dollar & Svensson 2000; Dijkstra 2002). Compliance 
to conditionalities can thus not be bought. Reform orientation needs to be genuine and fully en-
dorsed by a recipient (White and Morrissey, 1997; Gunning 2005:4). But this seemingly points to 
a paradox: if a reform oriented government is in power, there is no need for conditionalities. And 
when there is not, conditionalities will not work (Morissey 2005:241-242).
In general it is thought that stronger governments (in terms of capacities, commit-
ment and performance) are better at resisting conditionalities. Crawford (2001) argues other-
wise. Both weak and strong governments have proven in the past to be able to circumvent condi-
tionalities. Scott (1990) rightly distinguishes active forms of resistance from passive resistance. 
Actors in a strong bargaining position will be more inclined to actively resist and voice discon-
tent, actors in a weak bargaining position will display more passive (and therefore more creative) 
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Commitment (or lack thereof) however is not such a straightforward, easily rec-
ognizable characteristic. Fritz and Menocal (2006) correctly argue that ownership is easy to 
recognize in hindsight, when the results have been achieved, but it is a lot harder to predict it in 
foresight (ibid.). And without objective ownership indicators, how can one assess the value of 
‘voiced commitments’. How deep is commitment? How stable? How long lasting? And around 
which issues can ownership be detected? Will committed discourse furthermore translate into 
committed action and implementation? In some occasions the lack of government ownership is 
clear in the way in which they deal with the policy dialogue itself: high absenteeism, ever chang-
ing and/or badly prepared government representatives, attendance of lower rank and file public 
servants with no decision making power or influence, agreements are reached but then unilater-
ally reversed by the government a couple of days later, etc. In other cases however, where com-
mitment to the policy dialogue can be noted because the right government people are present, 
well prepared and have decision making power over the issues at stake, donors often mentioned 
that commitment can be high during the policy dialogue moments, but seem to water down 
after that. Ownership thus fluctuates and can be highly volatile. In the light of these events, do-
nors persist in pushing for reforms, even when the political circumstances favourable to reform 
appear to be rather bleak. As argued by numerous scholars (e.g. Hyden 2004; Birdsall 2005; 
Leftwich 1996) most reforms are politically and socially painful, and governments may not be 
genuinely convinced of the desirability of reform, either because what is proposed does not cor-
respond to their strategic priorities, or because it runs against their own political interests. This 
lack of commitment however will rarely ever be voiced by the recipient, not in the least because 
of aid dependency and the need to secure resources. Donors can increase compliance  if they co-
ordinate their actions, but this is not guarantee that there is ownership. Harmonization tilts the 
power balance all the way in favour of donors. This calls for some caution, yet donors, more of-
ten than not, assume that government compliance equals ownership, or they assume that it can 
be constructed in the process by providing capacity building efforts and/or technical assistance. 
As such it seems that donors often reduce political obstacles to technocratic challenges which 
can be solved. As mentioned earlier, ownership cannot be bought, but it can be strengthened if 
donors invest sufficient time in identifying existing pockets of ownership[9].  
When it comes to political conditionalities which push for further democratization, 
the likelihood that the recipient government has little to no ownership and henceforth will try to 
circumvent the donor driven demands, increases exponentially. This is because, as mentioned 
elsewhere in this report, the power holding government will not engage in taking measures 
which will decrease its likelihood to stay in power. It is unnatural for a government to nurture 
and strengthen measures which will pave the way for increased opposition.  As mentioned in 
the conclusions in the first part of this report: identifying and strengthening democratic forces 
in society. Supporting parliaments, political parties, civil society and the media might be more 
effective when using different approaches and modalities: project funding, core-funding, basket 
funding, including indirect cooperation (through Northern NGOs and Northern Universities).  
Aid has almost always been associated with some conditionalities, right from the 
beginning, and much of the literature suggests that donors do come out consistently as weak 
players (e.g. Birdsall 2005). Several factors will continue to plague donor resolve and expose 
them to excessive leniency in the face of recipient non-observance of aid contracts.  
[9]   The Drivers of Change approach developed by DFID and the, Power Analysis (SIDA) are all tools that attempt to 
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The toughest weak spot of donors is the fact that aid agencies are politically led. 
This introduces a host of challenges which are not always easily reconciled with the needs of a 
developmental agenda. 
To start with aid is, more often than not, a tool of foreign affairs. It therefore re-
sponds to conflicting or unclear objectives (Crawford 2001:198-199).  With different interests 
pushing through, the aid effectiveness agenda and its principles are just one of several param-
eters and objectives of foreign policy. Strategic, geo-political, economic or commercial motiva-
tions may therefore overrule the development agenda (Radelet 2006; Lancaster 2006; Balla 
and Reinhardt 2008). 
Secondly, aid money is tax money that has to be accounted for. The political heads 
of aid agencies are sensitive to pressures at home. The democratic imperative to be responsive 
to a wide range of stakeholders (interest groups, media, parliament…) and the obligation to ac-
count for results (parliament, public opinion) further exacerbates the multiplicity of interests the 
aid agency must incorporate into its daily functioning. Added to this, the pressure to spend, to 
show visible results and to avoid risks leads to impatience (Birdsall 2005).  
The above characteristics go a long way in explaining why donors often fail to be se-
lective, why they impose weak and partial measures when things go wrong (Crawford 2001:200), 
why they  fail to exit, and fail to coordinate  (Birdsall 2005). Particularly important in the domain 
of political conditionalities which seek further democratization is the involvement of civil society. 
The inclusion of civil society in reform processes has been to large extent disregarded. Instead, 
donors have taken a rather apolitical and narrow approach towards participation and ownership 
in a broad sense of the word (Birdsall 2005:15). 
Making abstraction of the above mentioned problems at the level of actors, there is 
also the way in which conditionalities are designed. Some conditionalities are prone to fail due 
to their lack of specificity. When a conditionality is unclear in what it sets out to do, when it car-
ries multiple objectives and unclear targets, the likelihood that it will not realize its intended ef-
fect is large. Experience shows that the more specific a political conditionality is defined and the 
less margin of interpretation it has, the more likely it is to be implemented. In general however, 
donors hesitate to be very prescriptive in their political conditionalities in contrast to economic 
reforms which seldom are characterized by such qualms (Crawford 1997: 185).  
There is also a tendency to overload the recipient government with conditionalities, 
especially when things are going wrong. Mostly negotiations end with a long list of required ac-
tions and the agreement that all conditions have to be met. The failure to satisfy any one of them 
would therefore in theory result in all aid being withheld, but as mentioned before, these kind of 
donor sanctions (the ‘all or nothing’ approach) is too drastic and not credible enough (Morrissey 
2001; Gunning 2005; Gunning 2006:302). 
Increasingly, streamlining conditionalities, characterized by intensified coordina-
tion among donors, has been gaining ground in development aid. The past has shown that in 
the absence of donor coordination, the recipient government may play out donors against each 
other (Killick 1997). Too much coordination among donors however very much worsens the nu-
clear threat of the ‘all or nothing approach’ (Gunning 2006: 302), and may lead to donors gang-
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4.  ConClusions
The literature review on conditionalities emphasizes that the credibility of sanc-
tions and the lack of harmonization were seen as important donor stumbling blocks. The cases 
presented in this paper suggest that these stumbling blocks are shrinking. First, in both cases, 
the donors managed to harmonize their voice into a common position (voicing concerns) and 
to jointly undertake negotiations. Obviously the Paris Declaration has boosted harmonization 
efforts, at least in voicing discontent and in voicing the threat of suspending aid/BS. Secondly, 
given the political sensitiveness of BS in quite some donor countries, pulling the BS plug is a real 
option. The credibility of sanctions has thus increased substantially. 
The fundamental question however is if overcoming these stumbling blocks will 
lead to more effective conditionalities, more effective aid. Most people we interviewed felt that 
the donor actions in both countries were very successful, that the process in both countries has 
yielded the expected results (ie the roadmap and the action plan, which will be used as monitor-
ing devices). Most people were thus quite optimistic in terms of how they dealt with the crisis, 
the yielded results and the government actions that will flow from this (given that future dis-
bursements will be linked to progress). Without government commitment/ownership however, 
without strong links to internal reform drive, it seems unlikely that improved harmonization and 
more credible sanctions will lead to substantial changes. Reform, and especially democratic re-
form, can not be ordered to be had. Yet, given the level of aid dependence, given the power of 
harmonized BS donors and given the credibility of sanctions, governments have no option but to 
comply, but there will most probably be varying degrees of government compliance with donor 
requests. A minimal implementation of formally requested actions is probably the most rational 
way for recipient governments to relief the tensions with the donor community. In both cases 
the relation between donors and government seems to have suffered under the process, which 
seems to indicate that governments were not happy with the process, nor the results it yielded. 
They will have to comply, but compliance is not wholehearted. Ownership is thus probably lack-
ing in both cases. Both cases also showed that donors failed to reach out to other drivers of 
change. At the moment of crisis, donors stepped in, took over and (in the words of one inter-
viewee) “squashed domestic accountability actors”, (in the words of another) “started to play 
the role of internal opposition”.
In both countries thus, the process is far from carrying all the guarantees needed to 
be effective in the long run. The proof of the pudding lies in the future. What will have been the 
effects of this process on the areas of concern and beyond say in one to four years?
Beyond the cases, what can donors do to prevent being swept away by crisis-like 
events? The new aid approach, which favours flexible aid, a hands-off approach, in which donors 
harmonize and align, is de facto designed and easy to apply in countries that are already doing 
relatively well. Given that a lot of low income and aid dependent countries score high on corrup-
tion and do not have a very good track record in implementing promised reforms and achieving 
institutional performance (Van De Walle 2005; Moore 1999), there is a substantial risk involved 
when donors send aid money through the treasury. This calls for the building in of guarantees 
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•	 Lower	ambitions	at	two	levels:	(1)	with	regard	to	what	external	actors	can	do:	
change cannot be bought, it can only be supported, (2) with regard to what recipi-
ent government can do: even when there is commitment, change is mostly gradual, 
not in big leaps. In both respects it is important to increase the understanding of 
the context and the role of external actors. It is crucial that lower ambitions sip 
through both within aid agencies, but also (and importantly so) within donor home 
constituencies, as they often drive the overambitious agenda. Accepting and work-
ing with the concept of “good enough governance” (Grindle 2007) seems crucial in 
this respect: avoiding reform overload, working with what works relatively well in 
that given context, and supporting baby steps to improve those existing arrange-
ments.  
•	 Recognize	the	trade-off	between	donor	accountability	concerns	(demands	from	
parliament and public opinion) and aid effectiveness/developmental concerns and 
manage these tensions in a way that does not undermine achieved developmental 
results. Harmonization should empower the recipient government, but it can ob-
viously be used to put the recipient under a lot of pressure to yield. This satisfies 
donor accountability concerns, but it might undermine the partnership and govern-
ment ownership over development.
•	 Selectivity	on	the	side	of	the	(bilateral)	donor:	from	an	aid	effectiveness,	but	also	
(and maybe more so) from a donor accountability concern, this implies that the 
more flexible aid modalities of the NAA are restricted to recipient countries where 
governments are sufficiently capable and are actually pursuing the kind of pro-poor 
and/or democratic results that donors wish to support. Selectivity ensures the pres-
ence of sufficient common ground and it may be regarded as akin to conditionality, 
in the sense that the donor unilaterally signals under what circumstances it is will-
ing to provide support, and verifies whether these circumstances are satisfied[10]. It 
is however not strictly a conditionality, because there is no contract. In this sense, 
selectivity precedes policy dialogue and it is a condition for its success. Especially if 
home constituencies in donor countries are very critical towards BS because of the 
political connotations, it is probably best for bilateral donors to explicitly introduce 
these standards into their allocation policy and assess them seriously (with the 
benchmarks set sufficiently high enough, so as to avoid unpleasant surprises).
•	 Results	orientation	and	elaborated	matrices	can	be	of	great	help	in	structuring	
an aid relationship and the policy dialogue, especially when things run smoothly. 
There must exist room however for discussing wider governance concerns (which 
are always political in nature) with the right people around the table. This will pre-
vent the accumulation of frustrations.  
[10]   The Millennium Challenge Account is a good example of such a unilateral signalling. This donor agency decided 
to measure the performance of potential recipient countries by using 17 policy indicators. These indicate the commit-
ment to policies that promote political and economic freedom, investments in education and health, the sustainable 
use of natural resources, control of corruption, and respect for civil liberties and the rule of law. Only those countries 
that are able to score above a certain threshold for a well specified number of indicators are eligible for support. As 
such MCC does not engage in policy dialogue ex ante. It uses quantitative benchmarks as a selection mechanism. For 
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This paper started out with the question where and when to deal with ‘political’ is-
sues. Should political issues be banned from the policy dialogue and delegated to the political 
dialogue? Or should the policy dialogue also tackle political issues. In general we argue that all 
governance issues are political and that there is no reason to ban politics from the policy dia-
logue. If anything, politics and political savvy should be brought in more, because every reform 
(however technocratic) is profoundly political. But the policy dialogue has its limits however. 
When things start to go wrong, they must be pushed to a higher level, where the right people, 
with decision making powers can make a difference. From this perspective there must be a syn-
ergetic relationship between policy and political dialogue. This being said however the paper 
also strongly argues for a separation between democratic areas of reform and technocratic ar-
eas of reform because there are obvious trade offs between both. Both areas of reform need dif-
ferent and specific approaches, modalities and timelines. Just like the technocratic reform area 
however, the democratic governance area needs the development of a strategy which should be 
broader than just electoral concerns. Reconfiguring the state-society relationship is a lot more 
ambitious than, say PFM reform, and therefore needs a very sophisticated understanding of the 
local context and it requires a time horizon that stretches far into the future.  46 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogueIOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 47 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
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Political Rights Score: 4 * 
Civil Liberties Score: 3 * 
Status: Partly Free  
 Ratings Change  
Mozambique’s political rights rating declined from 3 to 4 due to significant irregu-
larities and a lack of transparency pertaining to the registration of candidates and the tabula-
tion of votes in the October 2009 presidential, legislative, and provincial elections.
Overview 
President Armando Guebuza and the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) party won sweeping victories in the October 2009 national and provincial elections. 
International observers found that the overall outcome reflected the will of the people, but sig-
nificant problems pertaining to the registration of candidates and the tabulation of results un-
derscored the crucial need for greater transparency in the electoral process. Endemic corruption 
and weak judicial institutions also pointed to the broader challenge of securing transparency 
and accountability.
Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975. The Front for the Lib-
eration of Mozambique (FRELIMO), a guerrilla group that had long fought to oust the Portu-
guese, subsequently installed itself as the sole legal political party of a Marxist-style state. In-
dependence was followed by a 16-year civil war that pitted the Soviet-allied FRELIMO against 
the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), a force sponsored by the white-minority gov-
ernments of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa. The war resulted in nearly a million deaths 
and the displacement of several million people. President Samora Machel, the FRELIMO leader, 
was killed in a suspicious plane crash in 1986; he was succeeded by Joachim Chissano, a reform-
minded FRELIMO moderate. A new constitution was enacted, calling for a multiparty political 
system, a market-based economy, and free elections. A peace accord signed in 1992 brought an 
end to the war, and a 7,500-strong UN peacekeeping force oversaw a disarmament and demobi-
lization program and the transition to democratic government. 
Mozambique held its first democratic elections in 1994. Chissano retained the pres-
idency, and FRELIMO secured a majority of seats in the National Assembly. RENAMO accepted 
the outcome and transformed itself into a peaceful opposition political movement. Chissano 
was reelected in 1999, and FRELIMO once again won a majority of parliamentary seats. These 
results were deemed credible by the international community, despite technical difficulties and 
irregularities in the tabulation process. RENAMO nonetheless accused the government of fraud 
and at one point threatened to form its own government in the six northern and central prov-
inces it controlled.
Chissano announced that he would step down as president upon completion of his 
second elected term. In 2002, FRELIMO leaders chose Armando Guebuza, a hard liner, to lead 
[11]   Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010 (Last accessed 10, December, 
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the party. Pledging to address corruption, crime, and poverty, Guebuza and FRELIMO won the 
2004 presidential and legislative elections with a wide margin of victory, but RENAMO cited evi-
dence of “massive fraud” and initially rejected the results announced by the National Electoral 
Commission (CNE). The commission subsequently admitted that 1,400 vote-summary sheets 
favoring RENAMO had been stolen, accounting for 5 percent of the total vote. It transferred 
one parliamentary seat from FRELIMO to RENAMO as compensation. International election 
observers expressed concerns about the CNE’s conduct during the tabulation process, but ulti-
mately determined that the abuses did not affect the overall outcome. 
Guebuza’s government has largely continued the liberal economic reforms and pov-
erty-reduction policies of his predecessor. He has been criticized, however, for his heavy-handed 
management of FRELIMO and his uncompromising and confrontational stance toward the op-
position.
Mozambique held presidential, legislative, and—for the first time—provincial 
elections in October 2009. Guebuza was reelected by a landslide, securing 75 percent of the 
vote. His opponents, Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO and Daviz Simango of the newly formed 
Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), received 16.4 percent and 8.6 percent, respec-
tively. In the parliamentary contest, FRELIMO captured 191 of 250 seats, while RENAMO won 
51 and the MDM won eight. FRELIMO also won absolute majorities in all 10 of the country’s 
provincial assemblies.
RENAMO and MDM both alleged fraud. The European Union and other interna-
tional observer groups reported that voting was conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner, 
though they were highly critical of many preelection and election-day processes. They noted 
that the CNE’s rejection of party lists for ostensibly technical reasons—including the disqualifi-
cation of MDM candidates’ nomination papers in 9 of the country’s 13 parliamentaryconstituen-
cies—substantially restricted voter choice. The observers also documented irregularities that 
indicated ballot stuffing and tabulation fraud at some polling stations, though such distortions 
were considered insufficient to have impacted the overall result of the election.
Mozambique has achieved high levels of sustained economic growth since the end 
of the civil war, owing to relative political stability and the government’s commitment to do-
nor-backed market reforms. The economy has shown resilience in the face of the recent global 
downturn, with the International Monetary Fund estimating average real gross domestic prod-
uct growth at 4.5 percent for 2009. Mozambique enjoys close relations with donors, who have 
helped to finance high spending levels on priority social sectors and poverty-reduction programs. 
The government is working to increase the share of domestic revenue in government spending 
by expanding the tax base and increasing foreign investment. Donors have also put pressure on 
the government to enact “second generation” liberalizing structural reforms to maintain the 
country’s economic growth.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
Mozambique is not an electoral democracy. While international observers have 
deemed the overall outcomes of Mozambique’s national elections to have reflected the will of 
the people, electoral processes have repeatedly been riddled with problems. The 2009 elections 
were particularly criticized for widespread rejection of party lists and for “numerous irregulari-
ties” in the tabulation of results.
The president, who appoints the prime minister, is elected by popular vote for up 
to two five-year terms. Members of the 250-seat, unicameral Assembly of the Republic are also 
elected for five-year terms. The national government appoints the governors of the 10 provinces IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 53 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
and the capital city.Despite the introduction of elected provincial assemblies and municipal gov-
ernments, power remains highly centralized, particularly in the hands of the president.
Political parties are governed by a law that expressly prohibits them from identify-
ing exclusively with any religious or ethnic group. Although RENAMO and the upstart MDM have 
won representation as opposition parties in the parliament, FRELIMO is the only party to have 
held power nationally, and its unbroken incumbency has allowed it to acquire significant control 
over state institutions. In the lead-up to the 2009 elections, the government was heavily criti-
cized for disqualifying candidates from the MDM and a number of smaller parties in a majority of 
the country’s constituencies on technical grounds that many saw as politically motivated. The 
campaign period was also marred by partisan violence. Three MDM campaign workers were 
injured when their offices were looted by a FRELIMO mob in Chokwe. Another was assaulted 
by RENAMO supporters in Nampula. RENAMO workers also suffered attacks by FRELIMO in 
Maputo, Sofala, and Nampula, as well as in Tete province, where RENAMO offices in Changara 
were burned and one RENAMO supporter was reportedly killed.
Corruption in government and business is pervasive. Mozambique was ranked 130 
out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index. Local 
journalists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Center for Public Integrity 
have played a crucial monitoring role by investigating and exposing high-profile corruption cases. 
Under considerable pressure from donors, President Armando Guebuza has stepped up efforts 
to fight corruption. As of the end of 2009, former transport minister Antonio Munguambe and 
four other defendants were on trial for allegedly stealing nearly $2 million from Mozambique’s 
national airline. Former interior minister Almerino Manhenje, who was arrested in September 
2008 for the alleged theft of about $8.3 million from his ministry, was still awaiting trial.
While press freedoms are legally protected, journalists are sometimes harassed or 
threatened and often practice self-censorship. In March 2009, Bernardo Carlos received death 
threats after publishing a series of critical articles about the administration of Governor Ilde-
fonso Muananthatha in Tete province. Mozambique has two government-run dailies—Noticias 
and Diario de Mocambique. There is also a state news agency and a state radio and television 
broadcaster. Since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1994, new independent media 
sources have proliferated. These include several weeklies and the daily O Pais, a number of inde-
pendent and community radio stations, and more recently, news websites. Although there are 
no official government restrictions on internet use, opposition leaders have claimed that gov-
ernment intelligence services monitor e-mail. International media operate freely in the country.
Religious freedoms are well respected, and academic freedoms are generally up-
held, though there have been reports of teachers encountering pressure to support FRELIMO.
Associational and organizational rights are broadly guaranteed, but with substan-
tial regulations. By law, the right to assembly is subject to notification and timing restrictions, 
and in practice, it is also subject to governmental discretion. Public demonstrations have oc-
casionally turned violent. In some cases, security forces have broken up protests using dispro-
portionate force. In 2008, riots broke out in Maputo following a 50 percent increase in public 
transport fees, leaving four people dead and more than 100 injured. Campaign rallies prior to 
the 2009 elections were at times disrupted by security forces or rival party activists. NGOs oper-
ate openly but face bureaucratic hurdles in registering with the government, as required by law. 
Workers have the right to form and join unions and to go on strike. The law was changed in 2008 
to extend such provisions to government workers. The Organization of Mozambican Workers, 
the country’s leading trade union confederation, is nominally independent and critical of the 
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Judicial independence is undermined by endemic corruption, scarce resources, and 
poor training. The judicial system is further challenged by a dearth of qualified judges and a 
backlog of cases. Despite recent improvements, suspects are routinely detained well beyond 
the preventive detention deadline. Prison conditions are abysmal. According to Amnesty Inter-
national, 13 detainees died from overcrowding in a police cell in Nampula province in March 
2009, while 22 reportedly died, mainly from disease, in a prison in Manica province in early 
2009. Abuses by security forces—including unlawful killings, excessive use of force, and arbi-
trary detention—remain serious problems despite human rights training. Public dissatisfaction 
with the police has also led to a rise in deadly vigilante violence.
Excessive bureaucracy, pervasive corruption, and insufficient legal redress unduly 
hinder private enterprise, especially at the local level.
Women are fairly well represented politically, holding the premiership and some 39 
percent of the parliament, but they continue to face societal discrimination and violence despite 
recent advances in the law. Trafficking in persons, including the trafficking of children, is a seri-
ous problem along the highway from Maputo to Johannesburg in South Africa. Legal protections 
for women and children are rarely enforced.
*Countries are ranked on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of free-
dom and 7 representing the lowest level of freedom. Click here for a full explanation of Freedom 
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Political Rights Score: 3 * 
Civil Liberties Score: 4 * 
Status: Partly Free  
Ratings change
Zambia’s civil liberties rating declined from 3 to 4 due to new legal restrictions on 
the activities of nongovernmental organizations. 
Overview 
The government and ruling party stepped up pressure on civil society and the media 
in 2009, including passing a law that increases restrictions on the activities of nongovernmental 
organizations. Former president Frederick Chiluba, found guilty of corruption in a British high 
court in 2007, was acquitted of the charges and has enjoyed a political rehabilitation at the 
hands of President Rupiah Banda. Meanwhile, two foreign governments suspended funding to 
Zambia’s health sector in the wake of corruption scandals in the ministry of health. 
Zambia gained independence from Britain in 1964. President Kenneth Kaunda and 
his United National Independence Party (UNIP) subsequently ruled Zambia as a de facto—
and, from 1973, a de jure—one-party state. In the face of domestic and international pressure, 
Kaunda agreed to a new constitution and multiparty democracy in 1991. In free elections that 
October, former labor leader Frederick Chiluba and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD) captured both the presidency and the National Assembly by wide margins. However, in 
the 1996 elections, the MMD-led government manipulated candidacy laws, voter registration, 
and media coverage in favor of the incumbents. Most opposition parties boycotted the polls, 
and the MMD renewed its parliamentary dominance.
Dissent within the MMD, as well as protests by opposition parties and civil society, 
forced Chiluba to abandon an effort to change the constitution and seek a third term in 2001. 
Instead, the MMD nominated Levy Mwanawasa, who went on to win the 2001 elections. The 
MMD also captured a plurality of elected parliament seats. Domestic and international election 
monitors cited vote rigging and other serious irregularities. In the September 2006 presidential 
poll, Mwanawasa won a second term with 43 percent of the vote. In concurrent legislative elec-
tions, the MMD won 72 seats in the 150-seat parliament, while the Patriotic Front (PF) took 
44 and the United Democratic Alliance captured 27. The remaining seats were split between 
smaller parties and independents. The polls were deemed the freest and fairest in 15 years. 
Mwanawasa suffered from a stroke in July2008 and died in August. Prior to his 
death, Mwanawasa and his one-time fierce political rival, Michael Sata of the opposition Pa-
triotic Front (PF), publicly declared an end to their feuding, which had been a source of tension. 
After years of public rancor over the constitutional reform process, a National Constitutional 
Conference (NCC) was underway in 2008, although it was boycotted by elements of civil society 
and the opposition.
[12]   Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010 (Last accessed 10, December, 
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The presidential by-elections in October 2008that followed Mwanawasa’s death 
pitted his vice president, Rupiah Banda, against Sata and Hakainde Hichilemaof the United Par-
ty for National Development (UPND). Banda was elected president with 40 percent of the vote, 
against Sata’s 38 percent, and Hichilema’s 20 percent. Sata claimed that the elections were 
fraudulent and filed a legal challenge calling for a recount, but his request was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in March 2009.
During Banda’s time in office, the overall political situation in the country has been 
characterized by contentious politics and governance challenges. Banda has been in conflict 
with members of his party who have sought to challenge his leadership and presumed candidacy 
for polls scheduled for 2011. Meanwhile, government and ruling party actors have taken aggres-
sive and sometimes violent actions against the political opposition and elements of civil society 
thought to be against the president.
Despite substantial progress from 2004–2007, economic growth slowed in 2008 
and 2009 owing to the global economic recession. Increases in the global price of copper in 
2009 may generate improvements in 2010, however. Zambia experienced considerable debt re-
lief in 2005 and 2007, and has obtained substantial investment in recent years from China. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2008 pledged $79 million to support poverty alleviation 
and economic growth, and in 2009, it agreed to provide over $250 million to strengthen and 
stabilize the kwacha.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
Zambia is an electoral democracy. While local and international observers declared 
the 2008 presidential elections to be free and fair, opposition parties and civil society groups 
raised concerns about fraud, including the printing of additional ballot papers and the incum-
bent’s use of state resources for campaigning. The president and the unicameral National As-
sembly are elected to serve concurrent five-year terms. The National Assembly includes 150 
elected members, as well as 8 members appointed by the president.
The opposition has been able to operate, although under some duress. PF leader 
Sata has been arrested and charged with various offenses, including sedition, since 2001. While 
violent clashes took place between supporters of the PF and the MMD in both 2008 and 2009, 
there is no evidence of systematic harassment of the PF by the government. In March 2009, the 
PF joined hands with the UPND to challenge the MMD in the 2011 elections.
While President Rupiah Banda’s government launched an official anti-corruption 
policy in July 2009, concerns have emerged over his administration’s commitment to anti-cor-
ruption efforts. One of Banda’s ministers was forced to resign in April 2009after being found 
guilty by a judicial tribunal of inappropriate behavior. However, a high court ruling overturned 
the verdict, and the minister was subsequently re-appointed to a cabinet position. Banda has 
also abetted the political rehabilitation of former president Frederick Chiluba. A 2007 British 
high court judgment against Chiluba on corruption charges has not yet been registered or en-
forced in Zambia. Another corruption trial in a Zambian high court in August 2009 found the 
former president not guilty of embezzlement charges. When the head of a special task force on 
corruption attempted to appeal this ruling, he was dismissed from his position. Separately, an 
auditor general report issued in early 2009 stated that huge sums of money had been lost in 
2007 through misuse, theft, and misappropriation of public resources. Also in 2009, the Swed-
ish and Dutch governments both suspended funding to the health sector after it was revealed 
that millions of dollars had been embezzled from the ministry of health. Zambia was ranked 
99 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions 
Index. IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 57 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
Freedom of speech is constitutionally guaranteed, but the government often re-
stricts this right in practice. The government controls two widely circulated newspapers, and 
owing to prepublication review, journalists commonly practice self-censorship. The state-owned, 
progovernment Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) dominates the broadcast 
media, although several independent stations have the capacity to reach large portions of the 
population. The government has the authority to appoint the management boards of ZNBC and 
the Independent Broadcasting Authority, which regulates the industry and grants licenses to 
prospective broadcasters. The government has also delayed passage of a bill designed to give 
the public and journalists free access to official information. The independent media continue to 
play a significant role, although journalists have been arrested, detained, and harassed by gov-
ernment and MMD supporters in previous years. Criminal libel and defamation suits have been 
brought against journalists by MMD leaders in response to stories on corruption.
Conditions for the independent press and media deteriorated considerably in 
2009. The government and ruling party aggressively harassed and interfered with press outlets 
deemed opponents of the administration, specifically the leading independent newspaper, the 
Post. As of July 2009, the Post’s staff had been physically or verbally attacked by MMD mem-
bers on at least six occasions. In July, the government brought charges against the Post’s editor 
for distributing obscene material after a photo of a woman giving birth on the street was circu-
lated. In August, the government threatened to introduce a bill to regulate the media if it failed 
to come up with its own regulatory body. 
Constitutionally protected religious freedom is respected in practice. The govern-
ment does not restrict academic freedom.
Under the Public Order Act, police must receive a week’s notice before all demon-
strations. While the law does not require permits, the police have frequently broken up “illegal” 
protests because the organizers lacked permits. In 2009, police detained nine individuals who 
participated in a public campaign of blowing car horns to protest the acquittal of Chiluba and 
threatened to disperse meetings of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to organize 
the protests. Although NGOs have operated freely in the past, the government passed legis-
lation in 2009 placing new constraints on their activities. The law requires the registration of 
NGOs and re-registration every five years and establishes a board to provide guidelines and 
regulate NGO activity in the country.
Zambia’s trade unions are among Africa’s strongest, and union rights are consti-
tutionally guaranteed. The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions operates democratically without 
state interference. About two-thirds of the country’s 300,000 formal-sector employees are un-
ion members. While collective bargaining rights are protected by statute, labor laws also require 
labor organizations to have at least 100 members to be registered, a potentially burdensome 
rule. While unions remain engaged in public affairs, they have become weaker both financially 
and organizationally in recent years.
Judicial independence is guaranteed by law. However, several decisions in 2009, 
including Chiluba’s acquittal, tainted the public image of the judiciary and raised concerns that 
the executive branch was exercising undue influence over the institution. Legislation was also 
passed in 2009 that allows the executive to increase the number of judges serving on the High 
and Supreme Courts. The lack of qualified personnel, in part because of poor working conditions, 
contributes to significant trial delays. Pretrial detainees are sometimes held for years under 
harsh conditions, and many accused lack access to legal aid owing to limited resources. In rural 
areas, customary courts of variable quality and consistency—whose decisions often conflict 
with the constitution and national law—decide many civil matters.58 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
Allegations of police corruption, brutality, and even torture are widespread, and 
security forces have generally operated with impunity. Prison conditions are very harsh; poor 
nutrition and limited access to health care have led to many inmate deaths. Despite government 
efforts in 2007 to reduce crowding, in part by pardoning convicts, overcrowding remains a seri-
ous problem.
Societal discrimination remains a serious obstacle to women’s rights. Domestic 
violence and rape are major problems, and traditional norms inhibit many women from report-
ing assaults. Women are denied full economic participation and usually require male consent to 
obtain credit. Discrimination against women is especially prevalent in customary courts, where 
they are considered subordinate with respect to property, inheritance, and marriage. In 2005, 
an amended penal code banned the traditional practice of “sexual cleansing,” in which a widow 
is obliged to have sex with relatives of her deceased husband. In an alleged effort to intimidate 
members of civil society, Vice President George Kunda stated in 2009 that the government could 
prosecute the known homosexuals in the country using legislation passed in 2005 against ho-
mosexuality.
*Countries are ranked on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of free-
dom and 7 representing the lowest level of freedom. Click here for a full explanation of Freedom 
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Authority Trends, 1975 - 2008: Mozambique
Polity: 6 6 0
Democ: 6 6 0
Autoc: 0 0 0
Durable: 14
Tentative: No
SCODE MZM CCODE 541 Date of Report 31 December 2009
Polity IV Component Variables
XRREG XRCOMP XROPEN XCONST PARREG PARCOMP
3 3 4 4 2 4
Date of Most Recent Polity Transition (3 or more point change)
End Date 27 October 1994 Begin Date 28 October 1994
Polity Fragmentation: No
Constitution 1990
Executive(s) President Amando Guebuza (FRELIMO) initialy directly elected December 2004; 
reelected 28 October, 76% 
Legislature Unicameral:
Assembly of the Repuplic (250 seats: proportionaly elected; most recent
elections, 28 October 2009)
                    Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO): 191
                    Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO): 51
                    Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM): 8
Judiciary Supreme Court
Narrative Description[13]:
Executive Recruitment: Competitive Elections (8) 
After thirteen years of military struggle with the Front for the Liberation of Mozam-
bique (FRELIMO), Portugal abandoned its colonial claims on this poor East African country in 
1975. Without holding elections or a national referendum, Samora Machel was appointed presi-
dent of Mozambique and his Marxist-based FRELIMO was designated as the country’s only legal 
[13]    The research described in this report was sponsored by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The PITF is 
funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The views expressed herein are the authors’ alone and do not represent the 
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party. Following President Machel’s death in 1986, FRELIMO’s Central Committee designated 
Joaquim Chissano as his successor. In an effort to end the country’s long-running civil war with 
the South African-backed Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), President 
Chissano accelerated reforms aimed at transforming Mozambique into a multi-party democracy. 
The 1990 constitution paved the way for the conduct of the country’s first multi-party presiden-
tial elections in 1994. International observers described the 1994 elections, which were won by 
President Chissano, as meeting the minimum standards for a procedural democracy. RENAMO, 
which signed a peace accord with the government in 1992, accepted these results and agreed 
to cooperate with FRELIMO in the post-election era. President Chissano was re-elected in 1999 
in controversial elections that sparked sporadic violence between FRELIMO and RENAMO sup-
porters. While RENAMO claimed that fraud and electoral irregularities plagued both the presi-
dential and parliamentary elections of 1999, nevertheless, international observers deemed 
them to be relatively free and fair. In 2001 there was a simmering debate between old-line so-
cialists within FRELIMO and supporters of President Chissano over the future of the party and 
its leadership. In September 2004 President Chissano declared that he would not run for a third 
term in the December elections. 
Eight presidential candidates and twenty-five political parties participated in the 
national elections of December 2004. Despite very low voter turnout and claims by RENAMO of 
electoral irregularities, both the presidential and legislative elections were deemed to be largely 
free and fair by international observers. While these observers noted some shortcomings and 
irregularities, nevertheless, they argued that they were not sufficient to alter the election re-
sults. The FRELIMO presidential candidate, Armando Guebuza, won a landslide victory while 
his party showed impressive gains in the National Assembly. President Guebuza was reelected 
with 75% of the vote in 28 October 2009 elections. Immediately following the polls, RENAMO 
general secretary Ossufo Momade demanded that the elections be annulled due to “massive 
fraud” and a transitional government be set up to run the country until the electoral laws could 
be overhauled and new polls organized; he suggested that “new sacrifices” may be necessary to 
“save democracy” in Mozambique. 
Note: The active dominance of the ruling FRELIMO over the electoral process and 
government policy ensures that the party will not a seriously challenged by opposition groups. 
In view of these structural advantages and the ruling party’s exploitation of these advantages, 
executive selection in Mozambique must, at best, be viewed as “transitional or restriction elec-
tion” since the end of the civil war and beginning of multi-party elections in 1994. 
Executive Constraints: Moderate Limitations (4) 
Despite functioning as a multi-party democracy since 1994, policymaking and im-
plementation processes in Mozambique continue to be dominated by the central leadership of 
FRELIMO. The National Assembly, which actively debates government initiatives and does gen-
erate some independent legislative proposals, nevertheless, remains clearly subordinate to the 
executive branch. Moreover, the weak judiciary remains unable to provide an effective check on 
the power of the executive branch. 
In November 2004 the parliament passed some minor revisions to the constitution. 
While these changes did not place any significant limitations on the president or significantly 
increase the power of the legislature, nevertheless, it did place the head of state firmly under the 
rule of law. Under these revisions, the president is no longer immune from criminal prosecution 
or legislative impeachment. IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06 • 61 Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
Political Participation: 
Political Liberaliztion: Limited and/or Decreasing Overt Coercion (9) 
Until 1992 FRELIMO was the only legally recognized party in Mozambique. Since 
then over twenty-five parties have formed in this country, the most significant being the civil-
ian arm of RENAMO. While RENAMO has agreed to cooperate with FRELIMO under this new 
democratic system, nevertheless, political tensions between the two parties remain high. While 
the government continues to accuse RENAMO of maintaining ties to groups of armed guerrillas, 
RENAMO accuses the FRELIMO-dominated government of electoral malpractice and the use 
of state funds for political purposes. Tensions between these two groups escalated in the after-
math of the December 1999 elections. Violent anti-government demonstrations and the boy-
cott of RENAMO parliamentarians resulted in heightened tensions in 2000. At the peak of their 
boycott, RENAMO threatened to form a government of its own in the six northern and central 
provinces where its political support is strongest. RENAMO parliamentarians ended their boy-
cott of the National Assembly in October 2000. Despite the contentious political atmosphere in 
Mozambique over the past couple of years, the FRELIMO government continues to seek a com-
promise with opposition forces and has accepted several proposals from these groups, revising 
the electoral law and in 2004 revising several controversial aspects of the constitution.62 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
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Narrative Description[14]:
Executive Recruitment: Competitive Elections (8) 
With the creation of the independent state of Zambia in 1963, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, 
leader of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), became the country’s first presi-
dent. President Kaunda declared Zambia a one-party state in 1972 and ruled continuously for 
the next two decades. As popular opposition to his rule increased in the late 1980s, President 
Kaunda agreed to end one-party rule. In October 1991, in the first multiparty election in more 
than twenty years, Kaunda lost the presidency to Frederick Chiluba, leader of the newly formed 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy Party (MMD). In legislative elections held simultaneously 
with presidential balloting the MMD also secured an overwhelming victory, winning 131 of 150 
National Assembly seats. Despite the return of competitive electoral politics to Zambia, hopes 
of democratic consolidation soon evaporated as President Chiluba concentrated on consolidat-
ing his own power through the periodic use of emergency decrees, control of the media and, most 
importantly, through the manipulation of the constitution. Relying on the MMD’s overwhelming 
majority in the National Assembly, President Chiluba pushed through a series of constitutional 
amendments in May 1996 that made only second-generation Zambians eligible for the office of 
president. The immediate political implication of this amendment was to make Kenneth Kaunda, 
Chiluba’s primary political challenger, ineligible for the post of president. Not surprisingly, in the 
November 1996 elections President Chiluba easily defeated his weakened and fractured opposi-
tion. While there was no evidence of substantial or widespread vote rigging or fraud, neverthe-
less, the overt manipulation of the country’s constitution for political ends seriously eroded the 
democratic character of executive recruitment in Zambia. 
After a protracted effort by President Chiluba to re-write the constitution to allow 
a third term in office, Chiluba finally announced that he would not compete in the presidential 
elections scheduled for November 2001. President Chiluba arrived at this decision only after 
facing significant opposition from both inside and outside his party. Despite the overwhelming 
dominance of Chiluba’s MMD in the National Assembly, over fifty percent of the MPs signed a 
petition vowing to oppose his proposed amendment to the constitution. In the face of increasing 
street protests and widening fissures within his own party and cabinet, Chiluba abandoned his 
desire to seek a third term. However, in a last gasp effort to secure his influence in the future gov-
ernment, President Chiluba sidestepped party procedures and hand-picked the MMD’s candi-
date for the upcoming election, Levy Patrick Mwanawasa. Mwanawasa had been vice president 
in the first Chiluba administration but resigned in 1994, citing extensive corruption in govern-
ment as his motive. 
While largely free from political violence, nevertheless, the presidential election of 
27 December 2001 was characterized by widespread party fractionalization, incidents of voting 
irregularities and poor management. Despite winning a combined seventy percent of the popu-
lar vote, none of the ten opposition candidates in the campaign could defeat Levy Mwanawasa, 
who won only twenty-eight percent of the ballots cast. While the presidential campaign was not 
overtly fraudulent, international electoral observers indicated that pre-election manipulation of 
the process and numerous administrative hitches had distorted the playing field in favor of the 
candidate of the ruling party. The MMD’s abuse of public resources in campaigning and its con-
trol over the state-run media gave Mwanawasa an unfair advantage, while logistical and admin-
[14]   The research described in this report was sponsored by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The PITF is 
funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The views expressed herein are the authors’ alone and do not represent the 
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istrative shortcomings disenfranchised thousands of people across the country (mostly in rural 
communities with pro-opposition leanings). Both the European Union and the Carter Center 
indicated that the election results did not reflect the will of the people. However, despite the ir-
regularities associated with this election, the failure of the deeply divided opposition to promote 
a coalition candidate also provided significant insights into the electoral success of Mwanawasa. 
The autonomy of President Mwanawasa from Chiluba – who remained head of the 
MMD –was initially unclear. During the campaign Mwanawasa presented himself as both a po-
litical reformer and a populist. His pledge to eliminate the presidential discretionary funds used 
extensively by Chiluba to buy political loyalty and his desire to soften the country’s adherence to 
the structural adjustment policies negotiated by his predecessor both indicated a general desire 
by Mwanawasa to distance himself from his political benefactor. Nevertheless, given the man-
ner in which President Mwanawasa gained his party’s nomination, it was widely perceived that 
his main function as president would be to protect Chiluba and his associates from their legacy 
of corruption and theft of public funds. However, the autonomy of Mwanawasa from Chiluba be-
came evident in July 2002 when the President asked Parliament to lift Chiluba’s immunity from 
prosecution. With the arrest of Chiluba on sixty counts of theft and abuse of office, divisions 
within the ruling MMD have emerged. In 2003, Chiluba was arrested on corruption charges but 
his prosecution in Zambian courts was difficult due to conflicting loyalties in both the bureau-
cracies and the judiciary. However, the prosecution was given a boost in May 2007 when the 
high court in London issued a ruling concurring with the Zambian courts that Chiluba and sev-
eral prominent officials in his administration were guilty of misappropriating public funds during 
their tenure. 
Mwanawasa retained control of the executive in elections on 28 September 2006, 
winning forty-three percent of the vote. He faced a significant challenge in the election by two 
opposition parties, but the split opposition left neither opposition candidate with a real chance 
of winning the election. Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front polled strongly in the urban areas but 
returns from the rural areas showed strong support for the MMD and Mwanawasa. President 
Mwanawasa suffered a stroke on 29 June 2008 while attending an African Union summit meet-
ing and died on August 19. New presidential elections were held on 30 October 2008 and won 
by MMD candidate Rupiah Banda by a very narrow margin over Michael Sata. 
Executive Constraints: Substantial Limitations (5) 
The executive branch wields significant authority within the Zambian political sys-
tem. Although the constitution gives the National Assembly substantial powers, in practice it 
has historically provided only a limited check on presidential authority. However, the legisla-
tive elections of December 2001 altered the balance of power in the Zambian political system. 
Despite the flawed nature of the electoral campaign, the new Parliament, in which opposition 
parties held at least 76 of the 158 seats, was the most representative since the country acquired 
independence from Britain. While the MMD still held an absolute majority in the National As-
sembly, the one-party dominance that characterized the legislature during the Kuanda and Chi-
luba years effectively came to an end. 
Unable to easily garner the two-thirds majority vote to pass many controversial 
bills, President Mwanawasa has been forced to negotiate executive branch policy initiatives 
with a relatively strong Parliament. However, in a gamble to limit the power of the opposition 
in the legislature, in late January 2002 the MMD sought to hijack the position of speaker of 
the house through unconstitutional means. The MMD sought to elect a sympathetic speaker 
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position be filled through an open electoral ballot. Fearing that the MMD had bribed some op-
position MPs to vote for their candidate, the opposition staged a boycott of the institution until 
this issue could be resolved. 
Also contributing to the enhancement of horizontal accountability in Zambia in re-
cent years is the relative strength of the judiciary. While the judicial branch was unable to stop 
President Chiluba from manipulating the constitution for political ends, nevertheless, during the 
past decade it has shown some autonomy from the executive branch. Most recently, the Su-
preme Court has agreed to hear a case against President Mwanawasa. In this case, held during 
early 2003, damaging testimony was presented which indicated that the President was involved 
in acts of electoral fraud during the 2002 campaign. 
In December 2004 Zambia’s main opposition, the United Party for National De-
velopment, staged a demonstration against the government’s decision to delay the promulga-
tion of a new constitution until after the 2006 elections. The opposition actively pressured the 
government throughout 2004 to reform the constitution in an effort to protect civil liberties and 
reduce what they call the “excessive powers” vested in the executive branch. Although the Con-
stitutional Review Commission appointed by the President in 2003 indicated that a draft consti-
tution would be ready by March 2005, Mwasnawasa has suggested that he does not expect the 
new constitution to be promulgated before 2008. Under the terms of the draft constitution, a 
presidential candidate would have to win more than fifty percent of the vote to assume the office 
of president. President Mwanawasa picked up less than twenty-nine percent of the vote in 2001, 
but he did achieve forty-three percent in 2006. 
Political Participation:
Political Liberalization: Limited and/or Decreasing Overt Coercion (9) 
While relatively peaceful in comparison to many of its neighbors, nevertheless, fac-
tional struggles provide a strong undercurrent to Zambian politics, an undercurrent that threat-
ens to wash away the political stability to which most Zambians have become accustomed. 
While over thirty political parties freely operate in Zambia, throughout the 1990s the govern-
ment of President Chiluba used its control of the political institutions of governance (including 
the media) to actively undermine the ability of these parties to effectively challenge the political 
hegemony of the MMD. The fundamental division since the 1990s was between President Chi-
luba’s MMD and Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP (Kaunda resigned from his position as head of UNIP in 
March 2000). This factional division has been associated with at least one failed coup attempt 
and numerous assassination attempts. However, the factional nature of Zambian politics runs 
deeper than the MMD-UNIP split. As the last decade came to a close, factional struggles within 
each of these parties increasingly turned violent. The MMD is increasingly divided along ethnic 
lines (Bemba vs. non-Bemba) while power struggles inside UNIP have become more intense as 
political contenders seek to fill the power vacuum left by the departure of Kuanda. In November 
1999 Wezi Kaunda, heir apparent to his father’s leadership role in UNIP, was killed. While many 
observers of Zambian politics have pointed the finger at the MMD as being behind this murder, 
many others believe that it stemmed from the anti-Kaunda faction in UNIP, led by Secretary 
General Sebastian Zulu. 
In the months prior to the December 2001 election the government sought to limit 
opposition voices through censorship, intimidation and the manipulation of the legal and elec-
toral codes. However, despite the occurrence of some political violence in the northern prov-
inces of Zambia, the remainder of the country was relatively calm. While several opposition par-
ties threatened to stage mass demonstrations across the country in an effort to discredit the 66 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-06  Budget Support and policy/political dialogue
government of President Mwanawasa, outside of some minor disturbances in Lusaka (whose 
citizens voted overwhelmingly for the opposition) the country remained peaceful during and fol-
lowing this election. The 2006 election, won by Mwanawasa, was also generally peaceful, but 
still characterized by polar factionalism. Particularly vexing to the Mwanawasa government has 
been the continuing agitation led by the main opposition candidate Michael Sata of the Patri-
otic Front who has rallied his supporters in the urban centers and the copper-producing region 
against government policies and the growing influence of Chinese investment.